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1. INTRODUCTION 
With federal subsidies to tax-exempt charitable organizations' 
estimated to be approximately $232 billion for the fiscal years of 2007 
to 2011,2 the public benefit of these organizations is an increasingly hot 
topic for Congress, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the entire 
nonprofit sector. Concerns over the hefty economic cost of supporting 
charitable organizations via the charitable-contributions deduction, the 
excessive compensation to nonprofit executives, the amount of charity 
care provided by nonprofit versus for-profit hospitals, and responsible 
corporate governance have led to a call for increased scrutiny and 
accountability of charitable organizations. 3 Furthermore, the IRS's 
inquiries into the alleged political-campaign activities of charitable 
organizations surrounding the 2004 presidential election-most notably, 
1. This Article uses the terms "charitable organization," "tax-exempt 
organization," and "exempt organization" interchangeably to refer to nonprofit 
organizations that qualify for, and have been granted, an exemption from federal 
income tax. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). In addition, the terms 
"exemption" and "tax-exempt status" refer exclusively to federal income-tax law and 
. do not imply exemption under other federal tax laws, or under state or local laws, 
unless otherwise indicated. For an explanation of the common practice of referring to 
all organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) collectively as "charitable" 
organizations see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
2. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 291 tb1.19-2, 
available at http://www . whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007 Ipdf/spec. pdf (estimating 
tax expenditures for corporate and individual income taxes with respect to the 
deductibility of charitable contributions to charitable organizations). 
3. See David L. Wolff & Michael D. Rosenbaum, GAO Survey of Nonprofit 
Hospitals Latest Step in Congressional Investigation of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 52 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 265 (2006); Kurt Ritterpusch, Grassley to Seek More 
Charitable Reforms Including Executive Compensation Changes, DAILY TAX REp., Jan. 
13, 2006, at G-l; Diane Freda, Sen. Grassley Queries Red Cross On Disaster Relief 
Role, CEO's Exit, DAILY TAX REp., Jan. 3, 2006, at G-2; Steve Teske, House Tax 
Panel Chairman Says Exemption for Hospitals Becoming Difficult to Justify, DAILY 
TAX REp., May 27,2005, at G-l; Steve Teske, Grassley Wants Nonprofit Hospitals To 
Account for Charity Care Activities, DAILY TAX REP., May 26,2005, at G-6. 
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the NAACP and the All Saints Episcopal Church in California4-are 
reviving the debate over the role of charitable organizations in our 
modem, politically divided society. 
Amidst this heightened scrutiny of charitable organizations and 
their activities, the Independent Sector-a nonpartisan coalition of over 
500 nonprofit organizations-convened the Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector in late 2004 at the encouragement of the Senate Finance 
Committee. 5 The Panel's mission was to provide recommendations to 
Congress "to improve the oversight and governance of charitable 
organizations.,,6 In a final report released on June 22, 2005, the Panel 
provided over 120 recommendations, including certain governance 
changes.7 State legislatures are also joining the burgeoning scrutiny and 
reform of charitable organizations, with several considering legislation 
to stop abusive practices and to improve overall transparency and 
accountability. 8 
Despite this recent focus on the transparency of charitable 
organizations and their activities, one recurring activity continues to fly 
under the radar of reformers: discrimination. Charitable organizations 
discriminate not only in the employment context, but more importantly 
in that of services or activities for which the government has granted a 
tax-exempt status-such as education. It has a variety of bases, 
including sexual orientation, marital status, and religious belief. 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale9 is perhaps the most renowned 
recent case involving discrimination by a charitable organization. In 
that case, a local ~ouncil of the Boy Scouts of America expelled James 
4. See Diane Freda, Intemal Revenue Service Ends 2004 Audit of NAACP, 
Finding No Political Intervention, DAILY TAX REP., Sept. I, 2006, at G-5; Diane 
Freda, IRS Finds Prohibited Political Activity in Nearly Three-Fourths of EO Exams, 
DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 27, 2006, at GG-I; Diane Freda, Church Status in Question as 
IRS Looks into Guest Pastor's Anti-War Comments, DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 8,2005, at 
G-6. 
5. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, About the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, 
http://www.nonprofitpane1.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
6. Id. 
7. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY 
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS (2005), 
http://www . nonprofitpanel. orglfinal/Panel_ Final_Report. pdf. The Panel issued a 
supplemental report on April 24, 2006 containing recommendations in nine different 
areas with respect to charitable organizations. Diane Freda, Panel Releases Long-
Awaited Second Report on Needed Industry Reforms, DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 25,2006, 
at G-7. 
8. Fred Stokeld, State Legislatures Joining Charity Reform Bandwagon, 108 
TAX NOTES 183, 183; see also Dolores W. Gregory, As States Attempt to Ramp Up 
Oversight of Public Charities, Some Look to Sarbanes-Oxley as Model for Audit 
Requirements, Daily Tax Rep., Sept. 13,2005, at J-1. 
9. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, after he publicly declared his 
homosexuality.1O The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the 
Boy Scouts' revocation of Dale's membership violated the state's 
public-accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. 11 Adopting a divergent view, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the New Jersey law violated the 
Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights (specifically, the freedom of 
expressive association) and upheld the organization's right to exclude 
homosexuals from its membership.12 Aside from its foundation in the 
First Amendment, the Supreme Court's decision raised a fundamental 
issue that remains unanswered: should a charitable organization 
continue to enjoy the benefits of tax-exempt status if it engages in 
discrimination? 13 
The type of discrimination present in Boy Scouts only scratches the 
surface with respect to seemingly widespread discriminatory practices 
or policies of charitable organizations. Consider the following recent 
examples: 
1. A Mormon-affiliated university terminated the employment of 
an adjunct professor who questioned the church's stance on same-sex 
marriage. 14 
2. A Baptist-affiliated university expelled a student who announced 
that he was gay on his personal website. IS In a statement released to the 
local NBC affiliate, the university president stated that "[t]here are 
places students with predispositions can go such as San Francisco and 
the left coast or to many of the state schools. ,,16 
10. Id. at 644. 
11. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999), rev'd530 
U.S. 640. 
12. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 659. 
13. See J. Christine Harris, Should Boy Scouts' Policy on Gays Preclude Tax-
Exempt Status?, 31 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 32 (2001). 
14. Todd Hollingshead, BYU Fires Teacher Over Op-Ed Stance, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., June 14, 2006. The article refers to four other "high-profile firings" of Brigham 
Young University professors from 1993 to 1996 due to controversies involving the 
doctrine of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Id. 
15. Mark Pitsch, Student Expelled from University ofCumberlands for Being 
Gay, COURIER-J. (Louisvi11e), Apr. 11, 2006. The University'S sexual-conduct policy 
states that "[alny student who engages in or promotes sexual behavior not consistent 
with Christian principles (including sex outside marriage and homosexuality) may be 
suspended or asked to withdraw from the University of the Cumberlands." Id. In an 
official statement, Jim Taylor, the university's president, stated that "[w]e are different 
by design and are non-apologetic about our Christian beliefs." Id. 
16. Robert Marus, Gay Student's Expulsion Spawns Uproar at Kentucky 
Baptist School, Assoc. BAPTIST PRESS, Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.abpnews.com/ 
944.artic\e. 
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3. A private Lutheran high school expelled two sixteen-year-old 
girls suspected of being lesbians. 17 In a letter sent home to parents, the 
principal stated that, although officials had not witnessed any physical 
contact between the girls, their friendship was "uncharacteristic of 
normal girl relationships and more characteristic of a lesbian one. ,,18 
The students sued the school for invasion of privacy and discrimination, 
demanding readmission, requesting damages, and seeking an injunction 
against the school's exclusionary policy with respect to gay and lesbian 
students. 19 
4. A private Christian school expelled a fourteen-year-old student 
because her parents were lesbians. 20 A statement from the school's 
superintendent explained that the family failed to meet its admissions 
criteria. 21 
5. An independent Catholic school fired a religion teacher after her 
name appeared among the signers of a statement endorsing abortion 
rights in a full-page advertisement in the local newspaper. 22 After the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dismissed her 
employment-discrimination claim, the teacher sued the school, the 
Catholic diocese, and its bishop in federal district court. Both the 
district court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed 
all of her claims. 23 
6. A Catholic elementary school in Ohio fired one of its teachers 
because she divorced and remarried without first obtaining an 
annulment. 24 Similarly, a Catholic school in Kentucky dismissed a fifth-
grade teacher after learning that she had remarried in a Presbyterian 
service without first obtaining an annulment of her first marriage. 25 
7. A Baptist home for children in Kentucky terminated a female 
employee after approximately seven months of employment because 
"her admitted homosexual lifestyle is contrary to [the home's] core 
17. Lutheran School Suit Tests Legality of Expelling Gays, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 30, 2005, 
http://www.signonsandiego.comluniontribI20051230/news _ln30expel.html. 
18. Id 
19. Id 
20. Robert Paul Reyes, Christian School Expels Student Because Parents Are 
Lesbians, AM. CHRON., Sept. 24, 2005, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/ 
view Article. asp?articleID = 2562. 
21. See id. 
22. John Shiffman, U.S. Court Hears Case of Teacher Fired Over Stance, 
PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2006, at B2. 
23. See id.; Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 
F.3d 130 (3dCir. 2006). 
24. Randall Chase, Teacher Challenges Church Teaching, WASH. TiMES, 
Nov. 15, 2003, http://www.washtimes.comlnational/2oo31114-113845-6019r.htm. 
25. See id 
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values. ,,26 The home made its dismissal decision after a photograph of 
the employee and her acknowledged life partner was displayed at the 
Kentucky State Fair, which informed the home of her lesbian lifestyle.27 
8. A Christian-affiliated law school's current "Policy on 
Nondiscrimination" with respect to the employment of faculty and staff 
reads as follows: 
The School of Law does not discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation but does discriminate on the basis of sexual 
misconduct, including, but not limited to, non-marital sexual 
misconduct, homosexual conduct, or the encouragement or 
advocacy of any form of sexual behavior that would 
undermine the Christian identity or faith mission of the 
University.28 
26. Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 
759 (W.D. Ky. 2001). The home issued a public statement addressing the dismissal, 
stating that "[i]t is important that we stay true to our Christian values. Homosexuality is 
a lifestyle that would prohibit employment." [d. 
27. [d. 
28. Liberty Univ. Sch. of Law, Notice of Nondiscrimination, 
http://www.liberty.edu/academics/law/index.cfm?PID=8533 (last visited Mar. 26, 
2007). The language of the school's admissions policy is similar but does not mention 
homosexual conduct. [d. In the interest of full disclosure, the employment policy 
further states that 
[tlhis policy statement is neither intended to discourage, nor is it in fact 
applicable to, any analytical discussion of law and policy issues involved in 
the regulation of sexual behavior, or to discussions of any recommendations 
for changes in existing law. Discussions of these matters are both practiced 
and are welcomed within our curriculum. 
[d. In comparison, the statement of nondiscrimination of the Columbus School of Law 
of the Catholic University of America with respect to admissions is similar: 
The university fully accepts the teachings of the Catholic church with regard 
to homosexual conduct and sexual conduct outside the bounds of 
matrimony, as set forth by the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. 
Consistent with those teachings, the university does not discriminate purely 
on the basis of an individual's sexual orientation without regard to 
homosexual conduct or other actions that undermine the university's 
Catholic identity. 
Columbus Sch. of Law, Catholic Univ. of Am., Statement of Nondiscrimination as 
Accepted by the Association of American Law Schools, 
http://law .cua.edu/admissions/CSLlnondiscrimination.cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
The nondiscrimination statement of the Villanova University School of Law with 
respect to admissions states that 
[als a Roman Catholic and Augustinian institution, the School of Law 
strongly affirms the teaching of the Church on the rights and dignity of all 
persons, and hence condemns discrimination on the basis of a person's 
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Because charitable organizations receive direct governmental 
support or "subsidies,,29 via tax-exempt status and a charitable-
contributions deduction for their donors, the primary question raised by 
the above instances of alleged, actual, or potential discrimination is 
whether these organizations should continue to receive such tax benefits 
if they engage in discrimination. 30 Currently, federal income-tax law 
does not explicitly address or proscribe discrimination by charitable 
organizations. 31 The only possible restraint on discrimination exists in 
the public-policy doctrine enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bob Jones University v. United States, which granted the Treasury 
Department (and the IRS by delegation) the power to revoke the tax-
exempt status of an organization whose purpose violates "established 
public policy. ,,32 
The IRS, however, has used the public-policy doctrine as the basis 
for revocation only with respect to organizations that participated in 
racial discrimination, advocated civil disobedience, or involved 
themselves in an illegal activity. 33 Although arguably well-intentioned, 
the doctrine presents more questions than it answers-the most 
important of which is what constitutes "established public policy." 
Furthermore, other questions pertaining to the doctrine remain 
unanswered and may be unanswerable, including (1) whether 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violates an established 
public policy, and (2) if an established public policy changes and denies 
protection to a previously protected segment of the population, whether 
charitable organizations are then free to discriminate against the 
sexual orientation. This position is consistent with the Church's teaching on 
human sexuality, which does not endorse homosexual conduct. The School 
of Law accordingly reaffirms its commitment to providing an inclusive and 
supportive community for all, regardless of sexual orientation. 
Villanova Univ. Sch. of. Law, Admissions: Non-Discrimination, 
http://www.law.villanova.edu/admissions/nondiscrimination/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2007). 
29. For further discussion on the equivalence of tax exemption and the 
charitable-contributions deduction to direct government grants of money, see infra notes 
208-215 and accompanying text. 
30. See David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice and Civil Rights: 
Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 
BYU L. REv. 167, 169 (2001) [hereinafter Brennen, Tax Expenditures}; see also David 
A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy and 
"Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 391 (2000) 
[hereinafter Brennen, Racial Discriminationl. 
31. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 169. 
32. See 461 U.S. 574,586 (1983). 
33. Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 391 n.2 (citing Rev. 
Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991)). 
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members of that segment. In addition to these questions, critics 
routinely note that the public-policy doctrine places too much discretion 
with a regulatory agency. 34 
This Article attempts to fill the void in current fedcral income-tax 
law with respect to the discriminatory practices of charitable 
organizations by proposing the enactment of a broad and well-defined 
nondiscrimination requirement in section 501(c)(3).35 Inherent in this 
proposal is the notion that discrimination by a charitable organization, 
including employment and the provision of services, is intrinsically 
incompatible with the organization's charitable purpose and mission. 
This nondiscrimination provision should be based on existing language 
in current civil-rights laws, but should be expanded to reflect the bases 
on which charitable organizations most commonly discriminate-sexual 
orientation and marital status. This Article's proposal, however, 
excepts churches from the nondiscrimination requirement because 
courts would likely view an imposition of such a requirement as 
regulating religious belief in violation of the First Amendment's free 
exercise clause. This exception defines "church" narrowly with an 
emphasis on a regular congregation and does not include common 
church-affiliated entities such as schools, universities, and social-
service agencies. 36 
Part II of this Article provides a statutory and regulatory 
framework for the proposal, including an analysis of the meaning of 
"charitable" under section 501(c)(3). It scrutinizes the failure of the 
existing framework and the public-policy doctrine to resolve the 
problem of discrimination by charitable organizations. Part III critiques 
noteworthy proposals: The first focuses on an expanded scope of the 
public-policy doctrine. The second expands the applicability of current 
civil-rights law to charitable organizations. Both of these, however, fail 
to effectively combat discrimination by charitable organizations on the 
bases of sexual orientation and marital status. Finally, Part IV offers an 
alternative approach to the problem of discrimination in the charitable 
sector that does not rely on other existing laws, which are of 
questionable application and lack the necessary breadth. The adoption 
of a nondiscrimination requirement would transform section 50I(c)(3) 
into the "gold standard" for all tax-exempt organizations, ensuring that 
34. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 186-87; Brennen, Racial 
Discnmination, supra note 30, at 411-28, 446; Charles O. Galvin & Neal Devins, A 
Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REv. 
1353, 1372-73 (1983). 
35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
36. See infra notes 326-28 and accompanying text. 
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their beneficiaries are as diverse and all encompassing as the taxpaying 
public from which such organizations draw their support. 37 
II. THE EVOLVING MEANING OF "CHARITABLE" 
A. lWlat Is "Discrimination"? 
Any attempt to define "discrimination" can cause consternation 
and incite controversy. A legal dictionary defines it, in part, as "a 
failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be 
found between those favored and those not favored. ,,38 It further 
provides that 
[t]he dictionary sense of "discrimination" is neutral while the 
current political use of the term is frequently non-neutral, 
pejorative .... For some, it may be enough that a practice is 
called discriminatory for them to judge it wrong. Others may 
be mystified that the first group condemns the practice 
without further argument or inquiry. Many may be led to the 
false sense that they have actually made a moral argument by 
showing that the practice discriminates (distinguishes in favor 
of or against). The temptation is to move from "X 
distinguishes in favor of or against" to "X discriminates" to 
"X is wrong" without being aware of the equivocation 
involved. 39 
This Article relies predominantly on the unequal treatment aspect of the 
definition, which clearly applies to the above illustrations of 
discriminatory practices of charitable organizations because those 
organizations imposed unequal or differential treatment in the context 
of hiring or firing employees, or in providing the services or activities 
for which they were granted tax-exempt status. Acknowledging the 
slippery slope that the use of the term engenders, it is important to 
37. Tax-exempt organizations draw their support "directly" from the general 
public by means of charitable contributions from donors, who receive a corresponding 
deduction. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2000); infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
Such organizations also receive support "indirectly" from the general public in the form 
of their tax-exempt status, which arguably constitutes a government subsidy or 
appropriation. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text. 
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004). 
39. Id. at 500 (citing ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 11-12 (1980». 
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consider the bases for federal income-tax exemption and whether 
discrimination comports with those bases. 
B. The Federal Income- Tax Exemption 
In order to discuss the incongruity of deeming a discriminatory 
organization "charitable," it is neeessary to understand the exemption 
statute and the regulatory tests that must be satisfied before the IRS 
grants an exemption. Section 501(c)(3) provides a federal income-tax 
exemption for nonprofit corporations and certain other entities 
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
. . . or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."4O The 
principal benefit of a section 501(c)(3) exemption is that the exempt 
organization is entitled to receive charitable eontributions that are tax-
deductible to its donors under section 170(a)(1).41 For the most part, 
only organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) are eligible for this 
valuable benefit. 42 
IRS regulations and rulings defme each of the eight specific 
exempt purposes listed in the statute (for example, religious, charitable, 
and educational).43 Section 501(c)(3) establishes. both an organizational 
test and an operational test for determining whether an organization 
fulfills its exempt purposes;44 to qualify for exemption, an organization 
must meet both tests. 45 The organizational test relates solely to the 
language used in the organization's governing docurnents. 46 An 
40. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). Specifically, section 501(a) provides that "[a]n 
organization described in subsection (c) or (d) ... shall be exempt from taxation under 
this subtitle." Id. § 501(a). 
41. Id. § 170( a)( 1) (" [T]here shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable 
contribution ... payment of which is made within the taxable year."). Donors must 
primarily make contributions to either governmental entities or charitable organizations 
under section 501(c)(3). See id. § 170(c)(1)-(2). 
42. Certain veterans organizations, fraternal organizations, and cemetery 
organizations, which are exempt from federal income tax under other subsections of 
section 501(c), are also entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions. See id. § 
170(c)(3)-(5). 
43. The eight exempt purpoess are as follows: religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, educational, or prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals, or fostering amateur sports competitions. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (as ammended in 1990). The IRS has determined that other 
qualifying purposes meet the overall public-benefit principle of section 501(c)(3) based 
on an expansive interpretation of "charitable." See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra 
note 30, at 178. 
44. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(a)(I) (as amended in 1990). 
46. See ld. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(b)(I)(i). 
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organization meets the requirements of the test if it was organized 
exclusively for at least one tax-exempt, charitable purpose. 47 This is 
possible only if the organizing document (1) limits the organization's 
purpose to one or more exempt purposes, and (2) does not expressly 
empower it to substantially engage in activities that do not further any 
exempt purposes. 48 The organizational test also imposes requirements 
on the distribution of the organization's assets upon dissolution. 49 
The purpose of the operational test is to ensure that an exempt 
organization's resources and activities are devoted primarily to its 
exempt purposes. The regulations break down the operational test into 
two components: (1) the primary-purpose-or-activity test and (2) the 
private-inurement prohibition.50 Under the primary-purpose-or-activity 
test, "an organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one 
or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which 
accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 
501(c)(3). ,,51 An organization will not pass this test if "more than an 
insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt 
purpose. ,,52 
Under the private-inurement prohibition, an organization will not 
satisfy the operational test "if its net earnings inure in whole or in part 
to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals. ,,53 The regulations 
define the term "private shareholder or individual" as "persons having 
a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization, ,,54 
such as officers, directors, or other individuals in a position to assert 
influence or control over the organization's operations and activities.55 
The prohibition is absolute-any amount of inurement is 
impermissible.56 Organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) are also 
47. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1). 
48. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(l)(i). 
49. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4). The IRS typically implements this regulation 
by requiring an organization, either in its governing document or under relevant state 
law, to explicitly dedicate its assets to one or more exempt purposes in the event of 
dissolution. Id. 
50. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) to (2). 
51. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(l). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (c)(2). 
54. Id. § 1.501(a)-1(c); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 
1991) ("The proscription against inurement generally applies to ... persons who, 
because of their particular relationship with an organization, have an opportunity to 
control or influence its activities. "). 
55. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
§ 19.3, at 488 (8th ed. 2003). 
56. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (c)(2). 
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subject to other statutory and regulatory standards with respect to their 
operations, including the private-benefit doctrine. 57 
The Supreme Court's Bob Jones University decision imposes the 
additional, nonstatutory public-policy doctrine on an organization 
seeking tax-exempt status. 58 By failing to articulate a clear definition of 
what constitutes "established public policy," courts have left the 
doctrine open to the IRS's unfettered discretion,59 potentially allowing 
discrimination to flourish in areas other than race. 
C. The Statutory Impact of "Charitable" 
The failure of the public-policy doctrine to adequately check 
discrimination and the recent focus on the transparency and 
accountability of charitable organizations has revived the age-old 
conundrum of what the expected role of such organizations is in our 
society. If accountability necessarily implies that organizations must 
accomplish the purposes for which the government granted them tax-
exempt status, what is meant by the use of the term "charitable"? More 
importantly, does our notion of "charitable" apply to all purposes 
enumerated in section 501 (c)(3) , so that if one concludes that the 
antithesis of "charitable" is discrimination, the result is a 
nondiscrimination requirement applicable to all organizations described 
under section 501(c)(3)? 
Organizations that receive an exemption from federal income tax 
under section 501(c)(3) are commonly referred to as charitable 
organizations.60 The term "charitable" is used as a collective term, 
despite the fact that it is one of many descriptive terms used in the 
statute.61 This collective use may be attributed to the fact that all of the 
organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are eligible to receive tax-
deductible charitable contributions. 62 The term "charitable" originates 
from the English common law of charitable trusts-specifically, from 
the definition of "charitable purposes" in the Preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses of 1601Y Common-law "charitable" trusts 
57. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). For further discussion on the private-
benefit doctrine and other operational restrictions, see Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish 
Control! My the IRS Should Change Its Stance on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary 
Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L. REV. 21, 30-34 (2005). 
58. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983). 
59. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 178 n.48. 
60. HOPKINS, supra note 55, at 103. 
61. See id. 
62. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000). 
63. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.1, at 104. A review of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses reveals how the term became an expansive concept in that twenty-one 
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encompassed "trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the 
advancement of education, trusts for the advancement of religion; and 
trust for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under 
any of the preceding heads.,,64 
The most important and relevant concept taken from English law is 
an "expansive view" of what constitutes "charitable. ,,65 Legal scholars 
and courts have concluded similarly "that it is not only impossible, but 
a mistake to attempt to formulate a clear defmition of charity because 
'charitable activity constantly changes' and the question of what is 
charitable arises in a 'number of different contexts.' ,,66 The text of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts-which is explicitly modeled after the 
Statute of Charitable Uses67 -and its comments clearly reflect the 
constantly changing contextual nature of the terms. The comments 
explain that most charitable purposes "are designed to accomplish 
objects which are beneficial to the community, ,,68 and no established 
benchmark exists "to determine what purposes are of such social 
separate charitable activities are enumerated therein. Charles A. Borek, Decoupling 
Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 183, 193 
(2004). "The activities enumerated include not only relief of aged, impotent, and poor 
people, but also maintenance of schools of learning and houses of correction, the repair 
of bridges and churches, and the 'marriage of poor maids.''' /d.; see also ROCHELLE 
KORMAN, CHARITABLE CLASS AND NEED: WHOM SHOULD CHARITIES BENEFIT? 3-4 
(2002), http://www .law . nyu . edu/ncpl/library Ipublications/Korrnan2002. pdf 
("[P]rcamble to the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 in effect codified the 
scope of charity that had existed in practice for more than 200 years .... "). 
64. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.1, at 104. 
65. Borek, supra note 63, at 195. 
66. KORMAN, supra note 63, at 6-7 (quoting John P. Persons et aI., Criteria 
for Exemption under Section 50J(c)(3), in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS 1909, 1934-35 (1977)). 
In 1867, Justice Horace Gray of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in defining charity, 
enunciated the standard for a "charitable class": 
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be 
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite 
number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the 
influence of education or religion, by relicving their bodies from disease, 
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or 
by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening 
the burdens of government. 
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867). 
67. Borek, supra note 63, at 198. The Restatement provides as follows: 
"Charitable purposes include: (a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of 
education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; 
(e) governmental or municipal purposes; (f) other purposes the accomplishment of 
which is benefit to the community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). 
68. Borek, supra note 63, at 198 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 368 cmt. a). 
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interest to the community; the interests of the community vary with 
time and place. ,,69 
In enacting section 50 1 (c)(3) , Congress did not clearly articulate 
whether the common-law definition of "charitable," or the more 
"popular and ordinary" usage of the term-namely, relief of the 
poor70 -guided it. 71 Although this distinction is arguably a semantic 
difference, it affects two important implications: (1) "the meaning to be 
ascribed to the term charitable as used in ... [section] 50 1 (c)(3) , " and 
(2) "whether the entirety of that section is intended to describe 
organizations that are in some sense charitable.,,72 Under canons of 
statutory construction, the disjunctive enumeration of purposes in 
section 501(c)(3) leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to grant 
tax-exempt status to any organization organized and operated for one of 
these enumerated purposes.73 Accordingly, one conclusion is that the 
section 501(c)(3) purposes "are not overlain with a requirement that all 
organizations, to be exempt under that section, must qualify as entities 
that are charitable in the common law sense. ,,74 
Legislative history-in the form of a 1939 report of the House of 
Representatives-however, appears to illustrate otherwise: 75 
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to 
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the 
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its 
relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to 
69. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. b). 
70. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.1, at 104. 
7l. Id. § 5.2, at 106. 
72. Id. (emphasis omitied). 
73. Id. (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) 
("Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be 
given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise. "». Bruce Hopkins 
further explained that a competing canon of statutory construction provides that "related 
statutory provisions should be interpreted together," ld. (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 
417 U.S. 642 (1974); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941», which he 
states is particularly relevant because section 170(c)(2)'s charitable contribution 
deduction "reiterate[sl the separate and disjunctive purposes or functions described in 
[section] 50 I (c )(3)." Id. 
74. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.2, at 107 (emphasis omitted). Hopkins also 
argued that this conclusion conforms with another canon of statutory construction-
"statutes are to be construed to give effect to each word and that no one part of a statute 
should be interpreted so as to render another part of the statute redundant." Id. § 5.2, at 
107 n.26 (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303 (1961); United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955». 
75. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.2, at 108. 
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be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by the 
benefits resulting from the promotion of general welfare. 76 
59 
The use of the terms "public" and "general welfare" in the report 
appears to establish an obligation to follow the common-law meaning of 
"charitable. ,,77 Earlier legislative history lends further support to a 
broader interpretation of the term. 78 
The IRS promulgated the current regulations interpreting 
"charitable" in section 501(c)(3) in 1959, broadening the meaning of 
the term immensely. 79 The regulations unmistakably acknowledge that 
an organization may qualify under a section 501(c)(3) purpose, 
regardless of whether the purpose comports with the common-law 
definition of "charitable,,80: 
The term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its 
generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be 
construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 
501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within 
the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial 
decisions. Such term includes: Relief of the poor and 
distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; 
advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance 
of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the 
burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by 
organizations designed to accomplish any of the above 
purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to 
eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human 
and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community 
deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 81 
These regulations integrated "the concept that the meaning of 
charity [is] not static, but was meant to evolve over time to reflect 
76. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938». 
77. Id. Hopkins additionally stated that, to the contrary, the language 
"charitable and other purposes" may imply "intent to invoke a narrower meaning of the 
term charitable." Id.; see also Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 188 n.90. 
78. Id. (explaining that the sponsor of the 1909 tax-exemption statute, which 
only applied to corporations, stated that Congress drafted the provision to relieve those 
organizations "devoted exclusively to the relief of the suffering, to the alleviation of our 
people, and to all things which commend themselves to every charitable and just 
impulse" from income-tax liability (quoting 44 Congo Rec. 4150 (1909»). 
79. Id. § 5.2, at 110. 
80. Id. 
8!. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
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changing circumstances and the changing views of public benefit. ,,82 
Undeniably, the IRS has liberally and expansively interpreted the 
meaning of charitable to address the ever-changing needs of the general 
publicY 
Notwithstanding this legislative history, courts have not readily 
agreed with the regulations' interpretation of section 501(c)(3).84 One 
federal court of appeals concluded that the "term 'charitable' is a 
generic term and includes literary, religious, scientific and educational 
institutions. ,,85 Still another appellate court announced in multiple 
decisions that charitable-trust rules should be applied in determining the 
meaning of "charitable, ,,86 and that it was Congress's intent to apply 
such rules to "those organizations commonly designated charitable in 
the law of trusts. ,,87 In Bob Jones Umversity, the Supreme Court noted 
that Congress only granted the benefit of deductible "charitable 
contributions" under section 170(a) to certain eligible organizations, 
which are "virtually identical" to those enumerated in section 
501(c)(3).88 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress intended 
to provide tax benefits to organizations serving "charitable" purposes, 
regardless of an organization's specific section 501(c)(3) activities. 89 In 
other words, each of the eight purposes in section 501(c)(3) falls within 
a broad classification of "charitable. ,,90 In announcing the public-policy 
doctrine, the Bob Jones University Court solidified the broad view that 
all tax-exempt organizations described in section 501 (c)(3) are 
considered "charitable." 
82. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 101 (2004). 
83. Id. at 245. 
84. See HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.2, at 110. 
85. Id. § 5.2, at 111 (quoting United States v. Proprietors of Soc. Law 
Library, 102 F.2d 481,483 (1st Cir. 1939)). 
86. Id. (citing Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting of Annuities v. 
Helvering, 66 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1933)). 
87. Id (quoting Int'! Reform Fed'n v. Dist. Unemployment Bd., 131 F.2d 
337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). 
88. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,586-88 (1983). In 
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court adopted the Fourth Circuit's analysis. See 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147,151 (4th Cir. 1980). 
89. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 587-88. 
90. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.2, at 107 n.22, 111. 
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D. The Public-Policy Doctrine's Impact on "Charitable" 
1. BOB JONES UNIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES 
The controversy that culminated in Bob Jones University bcgan in 
1970 when a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction 
compelling the IRS to deny tax exemption to Mississippi private schools 
with racially discriminatory admissions pOlicies. 91 Until that time, the 
IRS granted tax-exempt status to private schools regardless of the 
existence of these policies.92 In response to the injunction, the IRS 
discontinued granting exemptions and prohibited deductions of 
charitable contributions to schools that racially discriminatcd. 93 The IRS 
notified private schools of this new policy by means of a press release 
and a letter. 94 In addition, it issued a revenue ruling that formally 
established this new policy and required these schools to adopt and 
maintain a policy of nondiscrimination with respect to students in the 
admissions process, scholarship and loan programs, and school-
administered programs (like athletics). 95 
91. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 (D.D.C. 1970); see 
Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1357 ("The Green [v. Kennedy] court suggested 
that the IRS would not be permitted to grant tax-exempt status to institutions that violate 
the government's public policy of nondiscrimination. "). In Green v. Connally, the 
district court permanently enjoined the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to any 
Mississippi school that failed to publicly sustain a nondiscrimination policy. 330 F. 
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) 
92. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577. 
93. See Press Release, I.R.S., I.R.S. Announces Position on Private Schools 
(July 10, 1970), reprinted in Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Congo 10 
(1979); see also Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 400-01. 
94. Id.; Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578. 
95. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. In explaining the basis for the 
ruling, the IRS stated the following: 
Under common law, the term "charity" encompasses all three of the major 
categories identified separately under section 501(c)(3) of the Code as 
religious, educational, and charitable. Both the courts and the Internal 
Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory requirement of 
being "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, *** or 
educational purposes" was intended to express the basic common law 
concept. Thus, a school asserting a right to the benefits provided for in 
section 501(c)(3) of the Code as being organized and operated exclusively 
for educational purposes must be a common law charity in order to be 
exempt under that section. 
Id. In concluding that a school without a racially nondiscriminatory policy with respect 
to students is not "charitable," the IRS relied on the charitable-trust principle that "the 
purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy." Id. The IRS 
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Bob Jones University's mission was "to conduct an institution of 
learning . . . giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the 
ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures. ,,96 Based on its founders' belief 
that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage, the Greenville, 
South Carolina institution sustained a racially discriminatory admissions 
pOlicy.97 Upon formal notification by the IRS of the new 
nondiscrimination requirement for private schools, Bob Jones 
University first filed suit in 1971 in an attempt to protect its tax-exempt 
status.98 On January 19, 1976, the IRS revoked the university's 
charitable exemption retroactive to the day after the date on which the 
university received the notification letter regarding the IRS's change in 
policy for private schools. 99 
As a vehicle for challenging the revocation of its exemption, the 
university challenged the revocation of its exemption by filing a second 
suit in federal district court seeking a refund of federal unemployment 
subsequently released guidelines for determining whether private schools had 
adequately publicized their racially nondiscriminatory policy. See Rev. Proc. 72-54, 
1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The guidelines require scbools 
to (I) declare their racially nondiscriminatory policy in their governing documents and 
catalogs, (2) make their policy known to all segments of the community through 
newspapers and broadcast media, and (3) keep detailed records demonstrating their 
compliance with such guidelines. See id. at 587-88, 590. Furthermore, the IRS 
announced its denial of tax-exempt status to any religious organization with racially 
discriminatory policies, even if sincere religious belief served as the foundation for the 
discrimination. See Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1358 n.23 (citing Rev. Rul. 75-
231, 1975-1 C.B. 158). 
96. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579-80. Although not affiliated with any 
particular Christian denomination, the university is "dedicated to the teaching and 
propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs." Id. at 580. 
97. See id. at 580. Specifically, the university admitted no black students until 
1971. Id. From 1971 to 1975, it continued its discrimination against unmarried blacks, 
but accepted applications from black students married within their race. Id. In 
accordance with the Fourth Circuit's decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 
(4th Cir. 1975), aff'd 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which determined that racial exclusion 
from private schools was illegal, the university admitted unmarried blacks. See Bob 
Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580. It maintained a disciplinary rule that prohibited 
interracial dating and marriage, however, and denied admissions to prospective students 
and expelled enrolled students that violated the rule. See id. at 580-81. 
98. Bob Jones University's first suit culminated in Bob Jones University v. 
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). There, the Supreme Court held that the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2000), did not permit the university to obtain judicial 
review through an injunctive action prior to the assessment or collection of any tax. 
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581 (discussing Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. 725). 
99. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581. The university received a letter from 
the IRS dated November 30, 1970. Id. In addition to stating the IRS's new policy, the 
letter also announced the agency's "intention to challenge the tax-exempt status of 
private schools practicing racial discrimination in their admissions policies." Id. 
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tax paid to the IRS.lOO The government counterclaimed for unpaid 
taxes. 101 The district court determined that the revocation of the 
university's exempt status exceeded the IRS's delegated powers and 
violated the university's First Amendment religious rights. 102 The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district-court decision on 
appeal, stating that an educational institution must be "'charitable' in 
the common law sense, and ... must not be contrary to public policy" 
to be eligible for exemption.103 Furthermore, the court of appeals 
determined that the university failed this requirement, because its 
"racial policies violated the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our 
Constitution, condemning racial discrimination and, more specifically, 
the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in 
education, public or private. ,,104 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision by a 
vote of eight to one.105 The Court noted that, in order to qualify for 
exempt status under section 501(c)(3), an organization must (1) fall 
within one of the eight categories set forth in the statute, and (2) 
demonstrate that its activities are not contrary to established public 
policy.l06 In opting for a broader concept of charity, the Court rejected 
the university's argument that the eight categories in the statute are 
disjunctive and, therefore, an organization need not also qualify as 
"charitable" to be tax-exempt. 107 The Court observed that, although 
section 501(c)(3) does not explicitly impose a public-policy limitation, 
Congress nevertheless intended that "entitlement to tax exemption 
depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity-namely, 
that an institution . . . must serve a public purpose and not be contrary 
to established public policy. ,,108 
The Court further observed the interaction between sections 170 
and 501(c)(3): 
100. /d. at 581-82. 
101. /d. at 582. 
102. /d. 
103. /d.; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th 
Cir. 1980). 
104. Bob Jones Uniy., 461 U.S. at 582 (quoting Bob Jones Uniy., 639 F.2d at 
151). 
105. /d. at 585. 
106. /d. 
107. See id. at 585-86. 
108. /d. at 586. In response to the university's "plain language" argument that 
section 501(c)(3) was devoid of any "charitable" overlay to all of the purposes 
delineated therein, the Court stated that "[i]t is a well-established canon of statutory 
construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on 
that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute." /d. 
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[Section] 170 reveals that Congress'[s] intention was to 
provide tax benefits to organizations serving charital'!e 
purposes. The form of [section] 170 simply makes plain what 
common sense and history tell us: in enacting both [section] 
170 and [section] 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax 
benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage 
development of private institutions that serve a useful public 
purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions 
of the same kind. 109 
Accordingly, the Bob Jones University decision solidified the view that 
there is a "charitable" overlay to all exempt organizations described in 
section 501(c)(3), and thereby provided the means necessary to impose 
a public-policy limitation. 110 
To support its conclusion that Bob Jones University violated an 
"established public policy" and, thus, could not be considered 
charitable, the Supreme Court stated that "[a]n unbroken line of cases 
following Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this 
Court's view that racial discrimination in education violates a most 
fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals. ,,111 
In addition to Brown, the Court relied on the civil-rights acts, as well 
as executive orders issued over a forty-year period, to conclude that 
eliminating racial discrimination was an established national public 
policy. 112 Ultimately, the Court relied on the aggregated 
109. ld. at 587-88 (footnote omitted). In enunciating a fairly broad standard for 
tax exemption, the Court explained that the the public benefit derived from the 
organization's activities justifies its exemption. ld. at 591. Furthermore, an 
organization's purpose must fall within one of the eight categories set forth in section 
501(c)(3) and "must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest." 
ld. at 592. The Court cautioned, however, that the organization's purpose "must not be 
so at odds with common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that 
might otherwise be conferred." ld. 
110. Cf. Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints On Charitable 
Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REv. 291, 292 (1984). As the lone dissenter in Bob Jones 
University, Justice William Rehnquist rejected the notion that there existed a charitable 
overlay to each of the delineated purposes in section 501(c)(3). He concluded that "the 
legislative history of [sectionl 501(c)(3) unmistakably makes clear that Congress has 
decided what organizations are serving a public purpose and providing a public benefit 
within the meaning of [section] 501(c)(3) and has clearly set forth in [sectionI501(c)(3) 
the characteristics of such organizations." Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 615 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1363. 
111. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954)). 
112. See id. at 593-95; Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 403-
04. 
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pronouncements of all three branches of government as constituting 
established public policy. 
The Supreme Court rejected the university's argument that the 
Treasury Department overstepped its lawful bounds in issuing the 1970 . 
and 1971 rulings and notices through the IRS, noting that the Treasury 
had consistently received "broad authority" from Congress to interpret 
tax laws. 113 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the IRS's primary 
responsibility of determining whether an entity is "charitable" under 
sections 170 and 501(c)(3) "may necessitate later determinations of 
whether given activities so violate public policy that the entites involved 
cannot be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of 'charitable' 
status. ,,114 Finally, in response to the university's argument that the 
public-policy doctrine violated its First Amendment free exercise 
rights, the Court affirmed that certain compelling governmental 
interests can justify regulating certain religious conduct. 1I5 In finding 
that the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in 
education was sufficiently compelling to overcome any First 
Amendment concerns, the Court concluded that the "[d]enial of tax 
benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of 
private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from 
observing their religious tenets. ,,116 
2. CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC-POLICY DOCTRINE 
Although it arguably achieves the correct result, Bob Jones 
University has nevertheless sparked extensive deliberation and 
cntIclsm. Critics have disparaged the Court for concluding that a 
charitable overlay to section 501(c)(3) exists and imposing a public-
113. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596-97. 
114. Id. at 597-98; see also Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 
404-05 (discussing legislative events occurring after the IRS's adoption of the public-
policy limitation in 1970, which made "an unusually strong case of legislative 
acquiescence ... and ratification" by Congress (quoting Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 
599)). 
115. Bob Jones Um·v., 461 U.S. at 603. The Court relied, in part, on Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which held that "neutrally cast child labor laws 
prohibiting sale of printed materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit 
children from dispensing religious literature." Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603. 
116. Id. at 603-04. The Court further concluded that the government's interest 
"substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' 
exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by [the university] cannot be 
accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, ... and no 'less restrictive 
means' ... are available to achieve the governmental interest." Id. at 604 (citations 
omitted). 
66 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
policy limitation on the statute. 117 They have likewise rebuked the Court 
for "abdicat[ing] its supervisory powers to the IRS" and "supplant[ing] 
the role of Congress as lawmaker by making broad tax policy 
pronouncements," rather than exercising the oversight necessary to 
ensure that the IRS properly enforces the tax laws. liB 
Professor David A. Brennen has criticized the doctrine as lacking 
legal or statutory authority and a "clearly defmed scope of 
applicability. ,,119 Since the IRS's adoption of its racial 
nondiscrimination policy in 1970, Congress has neither enacted any law 
that codifies the public-policy doctrine l20 nor provided the IRS with the 
"legal authority to act solely on public policy grounds. "121 As a 
consequence, Brennen questioned whether the IRS is the appropriate 
federal agency to determine if a charitable organization violates an 
established public policy.122 In his Bob Jones University concurrence, 
Justice Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., appeared to agree. To support his 
assertion that this task belongs to Congress, Justice Powell quoted 
Justice Harry Blackmun's dissent in a prior Supreme Court decision: 
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there 
appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered 
power of the Commissioner [of the IRS]. This may be very 
well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social 
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the time 
... but application of our tax laws should not operate in so 
fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in the first instance is a 
matter for legislative concern. 123 
117. See, e.g., Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1379-80; Galston, supra 
note 110, at 292. 
118. Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1379. 
119. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 186. 
120. See id. at 186 n.83. 
121. ld. at 187; Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 446; Galvin 
& Devins, supra note 34, at 1379. Congress did, however, enact section 501(i), which 
prohibits certain discrimination by social clubs. See I.R.C. § 501(i) (2000). Justice 
Rehnquist referred to the existence of section 501(i) in his Bob Jones University dissent 
as evidence that if Congress "wants to add a requirement prohibiting racial 
discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is fully aware of how to do it." 
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 621 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
122. See, e.g., Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 411-28. 
123. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 611-12 (quoting Comm'r v. "Ams. United" 
Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting»; see also Michael 
Hatfield et aI., Bob Jones University: Defining Violations of Fundamental Public 
Policy, in 6 TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY 1, 14 (2000), available at 
http://www .law .nyu. edu/ncpl/library Ipublications/Monograph2000BobJones. pdf; 
Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1373. 
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Brennen has argued that this lack of IRS authority forced the Bob 
Jones University Court to rely on an expansive interpretation of 
"charitable" in section 501(c)(3) as justification for the IRS's public-
policy power. 124 In disagreeing with such a broad reading of 
"charitable," Brennen concluded that the Court's decision failed to 
"address the limits of the Treasury's ability to determine when or if a 
particular 'public policy' is sufficiently 'established' in any context 
other than whites discriminating against blacks. ,,125 Accordingly, 
Brennen raised the fundamental issue of which sources of law or 
current policy the IRS should consult to determine that a national public 
policy exists. 126 While the Court looked to all three branches of 
government to conclude that an established public policy existed,127 it is 
unclear whether this standard is too restrictive to be applied in all 
instances or if a broader view of public policy should be adopted. 128 
The lack of a clearly defined source of public policy is only 
compounded by the significant evidentiary burden placed on the IRS to 
determine and prove that an organization's activities violate a 
fundamental public policy. 129 
124. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 186-87. 
125. Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 407; see also supra note 
112 and accompanying text. 
126. See id. at 436-39. For instance, no federal public policy or law prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation currently exists. Hatfield et aI., supra 
note 123, at 78. This continues in spite of the fact that numerous municipalities and 
some statcs have enacted ordinances and laws prohibiting such discrimination. Id. 
Indeed, Congress's actions to date fail to "come within the standards envisioned by the 
Bob Jones Court for proving the existence of a fundamental national public policy 
against sexual orientation discrimination." Id. at 86-87. 
127. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 598. 
128. See HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.4, at 107 ("[I]t may also be quite validly 
asserted that there is a federal public policy, either presently in existence or in the 
process of development, against other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination 
on the basis of marital status, national origin, religion, handicap, sexual preference, and 
age. "); see also Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown 
Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38-39 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Georgetown University 
violated a District of Columbia law prohibiting an educational institution from 
discriminating against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation, and concluding 
that the "eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling governmental 
interest"); cf. Hatfield et aI., supra note 123, at 86-87 (concluding that there is no 
"fundamental national public policy against sexual orientation discrimination"). 
129. Hatfield et aI., supra note 123, at 16. Beyond the evidentiary burden, the 
"IRS may also be loathe to jeopardize its own independence. Taking action against an 
organization for violating public policy, the IRS risks being reined in by the Congress 
or the President. Already unpopular, it may seem foolhardy to IRS officials to take a 
stand on controversial political issues." Id. The IRS has acknowledged this difficulty in 
its own training materials on the public-policy doctrine: "Deciding a case on the basis 
of public policy rather than a specific law is difficult because it requires discerning 
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Ultimately, the absence of a clearly defined public policy forces 
the IRS to balance its unfettered discretion in exercising public-policy 
power with the heavy burden of proving that an "established" policy 
exists. This difficult balancing act may explain why the IRS has used 
the public-policy doctrine as the basis for revocation only in instances 
involving racial discrimination, civil disobedience, or illegal activity.130 
Furthermore, the lack of a defmed public policy also leaves charitable 
organizations in the precarious position of monitoring the current 
political climate to ensure that their activities do not violate a 
contemporary public policy. 131 Reliance on the public-policy doctrine to 
combat discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, 
or even religion has been futile because such bases are not 
"established" public policy. Only Congress's enactment of a well-
defined nondiscrimination requirement in section 501(c)(3) will 
effectively end discrimination by charitable organizations. 132 
E. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify 
the Public-Policy Doctrine's Scope? 
Brennen propounded that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 133 
"implicates fundamental aspects of true democracy"-the convergence 
of First Amendment free expression rights with state and social goals to 
eliminate discrimination via antidiscrimination laws. 134 Clearly, based 
on the Supreme Court's decision, the First Amendment right to free 
expression prevailed. 135 Although it is difficult to argue that the inherent 
weaknesses of the public-policy doctrine resulted in the decision, it is 
certainly plausible to conclude that the decision only further exploited 
the doctrine's weaknesses, ultimately leading to IRS inaction. Due in 
what the public policy involved really is." See JEAN WRIGHT & JAY H. ROTZ, I.R.S., 
ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 9 (1993). 
130. Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 391 n.2 (citing Rev. 
Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991)). 
131. See Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1373-74 ("[Aln organization's 
survival may depend on the views of the particular administration in office. "). 
132. Although Brennen has proposed the codification of the public-policy 
doctrine as a solution for the doctrine's lack of legal or statutory authority, the 
doctrine's lack of defined scope and its difficult application prevent it from being a 
more effective tool for addressing discrimination by charities. See Brennen, Racial 
Discrimination, supra note 30, at 446. 
l33. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
134. David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of 
Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law's Public Policy 
Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REv. 779, 840 (2002). 
135. Id. 
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part to the public-policy doctrine's lack of a "clearly defined scope of 
applicability, ,,136 the Boy Scouts of America remains a charitable 
organization under section 501(c)(3) despite its discriminatory policies 
with respect to homosexuals.137 Although Boy Scouts did not involve 
federal income-tax law directly, in upholding the organization's ban on 
homosexuals on the basis of their First Amendment right of expressive 
association, the decision did resurrect the issue of what constitutes an 
"established" public policy and whether the Boy Scouts' discriminatory 
policy should preclude its "charitable" designation under section 
501(c)(3).138 Therefore, in the world of charitable organizations and 
tax-exempt law, Boy Scouts is more significant for what it did not 
address than for what it did. 
The case arose when a local council of the Boy Scouts expelled 
James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, from its membership after he 
publicly declared his homosexuality.139 Dale filed suit in a New Jersey 
superior court alleging that the Boy Scouts violated a state law, which 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of 
public accommodation. 140 The court's Chancery Division granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts, but the Appellate 
Division reversed. 141 The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that 
the Boy Scouts' revocation of Dale's violated the public-
accommodations law. 142 The court held that the application of the state 
law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of 
expressive association, because members could still achieve the 
organization's purposes with Dale as a member. 143 The court further 
concluded that the state had a compelling interest in eradicating "the 
136. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
137. The Boy Scouts of America and its local councils are generally exempt 
under section 501(c)(3). The IRS publishes a list of the organizations eligible to receive 
tax-deductible charitable contributions. See I.R.S., PUBLICATION 78, CUMULATIVE LIST 
OF ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 170(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 
1986 (2006), bnp:llwww.irs.ustreas.gov/charities/article/0"id=96I36,00.html. 
138. See Harris, supra note 13, at 32-33. 
139. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 644. Dale "declared" his homosexuality 
during an interview with a local newspaper at a conference on gay and lesbian 
teenagers' health. See id. at 645. The newspaper published the interview along with his 
photograph and a caption identifying him as a leader in the Rutgers University Lesbian-
Gay Alliance. Id. 
140. Id. at 645. 
141. See id. at 645-46. 
142. Id. at 646; see also Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 
(N.J. 1999) (finding that the Boy Scouts were subject to New Jersey's public-
accommodations law). 
143. Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d at 1223. 
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destructive consequences of discrimination from our society"l44 and that 
its public-accommodations law restrained no more speech than 
necessary to accomplish its purpose. 145 
Adopting a divergent view, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 
New Jersey law did violate the Boy Scouts' right of expressive 
association, and upheld the organization's right to exclude 
homosexuals.l46 The majority began its opinion by referring to Roberts 
v. U. S. Jaycees,147 in which the Court discerned that "implicit in the 
right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a 
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety 
of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural 
ends. ,,148 The Boy Scouts Court concluded that this "right is crucial in 
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would 
rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas. ,,149 In its "limited" 
inquiry into the Boy Scouts' viewpoints, the Court found that Dale's 
presence-which the organization asserted would "promote homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior" -would significantly burden 
the organization's foundation of encouraging its youth membership to 
be "morally straight" and "clean. ,,150 Thus, the Boy Scouts Court 
summarily concluded that New Jersey's interests failed to "justify such 
144. ld. at 1227. 
145. ld. at 1228 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984». 
146. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 659. 
147. 468 U.S. 609. In Roberts, the Supreme Court affirmed the application of 
a Minnesota antidiscrimination law by holding that the First Amendment right of 
expressive association did not sanction the Jaycees' exclusion of women. See id. at 623. 
The Court stated that any restrictions on the freedom of association "may be justified 
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression 
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms." ld. Furthermore, the Court found that the Minnesota statute 
did not "impose[] any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive 
association" and that the governrnent's compelling interest in eradicating gender 
discrimination outweighed any resulting constraints. See id. at 626. 
148. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622). 
149. ld. at 647-48. The Court elaborated that the protection of this right is 
"especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding 
dissident expression from suppression by the majority." ld. at 648 (quoting Roberts, 
468 U.S. at 622). 
150. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 650-51, 656. The notion that Dale's very 
presence constituted a message buttressed the Court's opinion. See Andrew Koppelman, 
Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the Changing Meaning of 
Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1827-28 (2002) ("[The Court] 
evidently agrees with the claim in the Scouts' hrief that the exclusion of openly gay 
people was the only way that the Scouts could avoid taking a public position on the 
morality of homosexual conduct. "). 
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a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive 
association." 151 
In a spirited dissent, 152 Justice John Paul Stevens expressed 
concern that, under the majority's standard, "the right of free speech 
effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every organization, 
whether or not it engages in any expressive activities." 153 Relying on 
the Court's prior decision in Roberts, Justice Stevens concluded that the 
New Jersey law did not "imposeD any serious burdens"154 on the Boy 
Scouts' "collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals," or compel the 
Boy Scouts to communicate a message that it did not wish to endorse. 155 
Similarly, Justice David Souter contended in his dissent that the 
151. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 659. Professor Andrew Koppelman has noted 
that the Supreme Court failed to discuss what New Jersey's interests were. Koppelman, 
supra note 150, at 1835 n.81. 
152. Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Stephen Breyer joined in 
Justice Stevens's dissent. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens began his dissent by alluding to Justice Louis Brandeis's maxim that a "single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id. at 644 (quoting 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
Justice Stevens concluded that New Jersey exemplified the "courageous" state to which 
Justice Brandeis referred and, therefore, the Supreme Court should not prevent or deter 
the elimination of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Erica L. Stringer, 
Has the Supreme Court Created a Constitutional Shield for Private Discrimination 
Against Homosexuals? A Look at the Future Ramifications of Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 181, 196 (2001) (citing Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 664 
(Stevens, 1., dissenting». 
153. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 695 (Stevens, 1., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
The only apparent explanation for the majority'S holding, then, is that 
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their 
presence alone-unlike any other individual's-should be singled out for 
special First Amendment treatment. Under the majority's reasoning, an 
openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label "homosexual." That 
label, even though unseen, commurricates a message that permits his 
exclusion wherever be goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient 
justification for his ostracism. Though unintended, reliance on such a 
justification is tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed symbol of 
inferiority. 
Id. at 696; see also Koppelman, supra note 150, at 1823. 
154. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 664-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts, 
468 U.S. at 626). 
155. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622). Justice Stevens also challenged the 
propriety of the majority's message-based conclusions and the Boy Scouts' asserted 
values by pointing out that Dale was an exemplary member of the organization for 
more than twelve years, had attained the rank of Eagle Scout (an honor accorded to 
only 3 percent of all members), and had been selected to be Assistant Scoutmaster. See 
id. at 665. It was only after Dale revealed his homosexuality that the Boy Scouts 
revoked his membership. Id.; see also Stringer, supra note 152, at 196. 
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majority's decision converted "the right of expressive association into 
an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law." 156 The Boy Scouts Court 
did not raise the fundamental question of whether a charitable 
organization's right of expressive association might "trump" an IRS 
determination that the organization no longer meets the definition of 
"charitable" under section 501(c)(3) due to its discriminatory 
practices. 157 
To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether denying or 
revoking an organization's tax-exempt status based on its discriminatory 
membership policy or other exclusionary practice violates that 
organization's First Amendment right to expressive association. 158 
While the Court has sustained limitations on other First Amendment 
rights of charitable organizations as a condition to tax exemption under 
section 501(c)(3),159 it is ambiguous whether the Court would similarly 
conclude that an organization's constitutional right to expressive 
association would not be seriously constrained by an exemption 
revocation or denial. 160 On the other hand, in light of the current 
political climate, it seems clear that the government would argue that 
no compelling governmental interest exists to eradicate discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Because the pUblic-policy doctrine lacks a 
clearly defined scope of applicability, the IRS has effectively sanctioned 
such discrimination by charitable organizations through the current 
income-tax law. 
III. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR COMBATING 
DISCRIMINATION BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
A pioneering scholar on the convergence of federal income-tax-
exemption law addressing racial discrimination, Brennen has analyzed 
and advocated potential solutions to the discrimination problem. Each 
156. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 701-02 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
157. For a more thorough discussion of Boy Scouts' implications with respect 
to the right of organizations to discriminate, see Andrew Koppelman, Should 
Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to Discriminate?, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (2004); cf. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-
Discrimination Law after Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1517 
(2001). 
158. Brennen, supra note 134, at 843. 
159. For instance, the Court has upheld statutory limitations under section 
501(c)(3) on charitable organizations' lobbying and political campaign activities. See 
infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
160. Brennen, supra note 11934, at 843-44 ("The Supreme Court has never 
addressed . . . whether it is constitutional to require an organization to forego its 
constitutionally protected freedom of expressive association ... to obtain or maintain a 
501(c)(3) tax-exemption. "). 
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of these proposed solutions has its strengths and weaknesses, and, 
therefore, provides valuable insights in formulating this Article's 
proposal. 
A. The Public-Policy Doctrine: Clarification and Expanded Scope? 
In analyzing the public-policy doctrine announced in Bob Jones 
University, Brennen ultimately concluded that the judicially created 
doctrine is not the proper vehicle to combat racial discrimination and 
that the IRS is likely not the proper administrative agency to interpret 
and enforce it. 161 In evaluating options to better apply, and achieve the 
purposes of, the public-policy doctrine, he suggested its codification to 
provide the necessary statutory authority for effective application to 
charitable organizations. 162 He also advocated for congressional 
authorization of a federal agency other than the IRS to "review and rule 
upon complaints of discrimination by tax-exempt charities," arguing 
that other agencies are better equipped to address such issues. 163 
Brennen has also argued that the IRS's almost exclusive reliance 
on constitutional-law principles in determining the boundaries of 
"established public policy" is inappropriate. 164 While observing that the 
public-policy doctrine originates in the Internal Revenue Code and is 
therefore a statutory, not constitutional, principle, he argued that 
charities are usually private, not state, actors; thus, they are generally 
not subject to constitutional-law limitations like the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 165 Brennen subsequently 
proposed that the IRS "could engage in a type of analysis that considers 
a variety of sources constitutional, non-constitutional, federal and non-
federal-in deciding if a particular charity is in violation of 'established 
public policy.'" 166 
Although Brennen's critique of the public-policy doctrine and how 
its inherent flaws prevent effective combat of discrimination by 
charitable organizations is persuasive, none of his proposed solutions 
appear to adequately address its problems. While the doctrine has been 
successful in eradicating racial discrimination in education, the lack of a 
clearly defined source of "established public policy" and the significant 
evidentiary burden placed on the IRS to determine and prove that an 
organization's principles violate public policy have rendered the 
161. See Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 30, at 446. 
162. Seeid. 
163. Id. 
164. Brennen, supra note 11934, at 848. 
165. See id. 
166. Id. at 849. 
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doctrine woefully inadequate in combating other forms of 
discrimination. In terms of marital-status or sexual-orientation 
discrimination, reliance on the doctrine is futile because such 
discrimination does not violate any "established" public policy. 
Although scholars have posited the existence of a national public policy 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,167 the current 
political climate renders such a conclusion questionable. 168 In fact, the 
doctrine's potential response to the whims of the political climate is a 
fatal flaw. 169 Despite these issues and extensive criticism by legal 
scholars, Congress has failed to provide a statutory remedy to the 
doctrine's deficiencies. As such, the public-policy doctrine-as it 
currently exists-is clearly not the best solution to eradicate the 
continued problem of discrimination by charitable organizations. 
B. Expanding Civil-Rights Laws' ApplicabiJjty to Charitable 
Organizations 
1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXPANSION APPROACH 
In addition to his scholarship on the public-policy doctrine, 
Brennen has also explored the expansion of the scope of civil-rights 
laws as a means to combat discrimination by charitable organizations. 170 
Although this expansion approach possesses more potential than any 
proposals based on the public-policy doctrine, it still fails to provide a 
comprehensive solution to the kinds of discrimination illustrated in this 
Article. 
167. See, e.g., Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 184; HOPKINS, 
supra note 55, § 5.4, at 125. 
168. See, e.g., Aamer Madhani, Don't Drop "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Pace 
Says, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13,2007, at Cl (discussing General Peter Pace's comments that 
homosexual acts "are immoral. "); Peter Baker, Bush Re-Enters Gay Marriage Fight, 
WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A4; Elisabeth Bumiller et aI., Bush Says Iraqis Will 
Want G.l 's to Stay to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005, at Al ("[President Bush] said 
that while "children can receive love from gay couples," he believed that "studies have 
shown that the ideal is where a child is raised in a married family with a man and a 
woman. "); Bush Vows No Compromise In Opposing Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 3, 2003, at A3; Dana Milbank, Charity Cites Bush Help in Fight Against 
Hiring Gays, WASH. POST, July 10, 2001, at AI. 
169. In his Bob Jones University concurrence, Justice PoweIl cautioned that 
conforming an organization's aetivities to established government policy "ignores the 
important role played by tax exemption in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply 
conflicting, activities and viewpoints." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 609 (1983) (PoweIl, J., concurring). 
170. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 169. 
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Although a citizen's civil rights are protected by a federal 
"framework of laws consisting of the Constitution, statutes, regulations, 
executive actions, and court interpretation," these laws do not apply 
comprehensively to any violator of such rights. 171 For instance, civil-
rights protection afforded by the Constitution does not normally apply 
unless the violator is a "state actor" -a term which generally does not 
include charitable organizations. 172 Although some federal statutes 
subject private actors, including charitable organizations, to civil-rights 
limitations,173 some of these statutes only apply if the private actor 
receives "federal financial assistance" (FFA).174 Brennen's expansion 
approach focused on those civil-rights statutes containing an FF A 
requirement. 175 
These statutes generally contain enforcement mechanisms, which 
compel the awarding governmental agency to promulgate regulations 
that implement the statute's objectives, including a definition of FFA.176 
171. See id. at 179-80. 
172. See id. There are limited circumstances in which a charitable organization 
might be deemed a "state actor." See id. at 179 n.51. Like Brennen, however, this 
Article focuses on charitable organizations as private actors. 
173. See id. at 179-80 & n.52; see also The Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-213 (2000); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
29 U .S.C. § 621 (2000). Also, under 42 U .s.c. section 1983 (2000), private actors 
that are operating "under color of state law" may be subject to various constitutional 
restrictions. As Brennen points out, however, a state civil-rights statute that applies to 
charitable organizations may be limited or invalidated by federal constitutional law. 
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 169. 
174. Id. at 171. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000d (2000); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2000); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
175. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 192. 
176. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance ... is authorized and directed to effectuate ... this title 
... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which 
shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute 
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is 
taken. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (applying nearly identical language to 
Title IX of the Education Amendments). The apparently standard regulation issued by 
federal agencies pursuant to section 2000d-1 states the following: 
The term Federal financial assistance includes (1) grants and loans of 
Federal funds, (2) the grant or donation of Federal property and interests in 
property, (3) the detail of Federal personnel, (4) the sale and lease of, and 
the permission to use (on other than a casual or transient basis), Federal 
property or any interest in such property without consideration or at a 
nominal consideration, or at a consideration which is reduced for the 
purpose of assisting the recipient, or in recognition of the public interest to 
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Regulations define FFA, in part, as a "grant, loan, or contract other 
than a contract of insurance or guaranty," 177 and courts have interpreted 
it in the context of these civil-rights laws.178 Essentially, FFA 
constitutes "funds received directly or indirectly from the federal 
government. ,,179 Thus, the government requires charitable organizations 
that receive direct assistance from the federal government in the form 
of grants or loans, or that receive fees from direct recipients of FFA, to 
comply with these civil-rights laws. 180 To address the large number of 
charitable organizations that do not meet either requirement, Brennen 
traveled down the arduous path of determining whether such 
organizations may be deemed to receive FF A in the form of certain tax 
benefits-principally, the income-tax exemption for charitable 
organizationsl81 and the income-tax deduction for people making 
contributions to such organizations. 182 In his analysis, Brennen 
considers two district-court opinions that reached opposite conclusions 
as to whether tax exemption constitutes FF A. 183 
In MeGlotten v. Connally, a district court determined that certain 
federal tax benefits-mainly in the form of exemptions and deductions 
for contributions-constituted FF A under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 184 The plaintiff in MeGlotten sought to enjoin the IRS 
from granting exemptions to nonprofit social clubs and fraternal 
organizations that excluded nonwhite individuals from their 
membership.18s In response to the plaintiff's arguments,186 the 
be served by such sale or lease to the recipient, and (5) any Federal 
agreement, arrangement, or other contract which has as one of its purposes 
the provision of assistance. 
45 C.F.R. § 80.13(f) (2006) (Department of Health, Education and Welfare); accord 7 
C.F.R. § 15.2(g) (2006) (applying nearly identical language to the Department of 
Agriculture) . 
177. 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(f); accord 7 C.F.R. § 15.2(g). 
178. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 171 & n.lO; see also 
Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that a college was a recipient of 
FFA because its students received federal grants); NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 
(1999) (holding that, even though its college and university members received FFA, the 
NCAA's receipt of dues from such institutions did not constitute FFA); Richard Foss v. 
Chicago, 817 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that, although the City of Chicago 
received federal funding, its fire department was not a recipient of FFA). 
179. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 171. 
180. Id. at 171-72; see also Grove City Call., 465 U.S. at 563; Smith, 525 
U.S. at 465-69. 
181. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000). 
182. I.R.C. § 170(a)(I). 
183. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 200-07. 
184. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
185. fd. at 450. Section 501(c)(7) exempts nonprofit social clubs that are 
"organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all 
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MeGlotten court ultimately concluded that the tax benefits granted to 
fraternal organizations under section 501(c)(8) did constitute FFA under 
Title VI. 187 In the absence of convincing legislative history, the court 
relied on Title VI's "plain purpose" of "eliminat[ing] discrimination in 
programs or activities benefitting from federal financial assistance. "188 
The MeGlotten court, however, also determined that the 
exemption granted to nonprofit social clubs under section 501(c)(7) did 
not constitute FFA.189 The court reasoned that such exemption, "limited 
as it is to member-generated funds and available regardless of the 
nature of the activity of the particular club, does not operate as a 
'grant' of Federal funds," and thus was not covered by Title VI. I90 
According to the court, Congress had determined that member-
generated funds should not be taxed because they are merely "shifted 
from one pocket to another, both within the same pair of pants. Thus 
the exclusion of member generated revenue reflects a determination that 
as to these funds the organization does not operate as a separate 
entity. ,,191 In other words, MeGlotten determined that social clubs do 
not function as entities separate and apart from their members. 192 
Finally, the court reasoned that, because the IRS granted the club a 
section 501(c)(7) exemption regardless of its activities, "there is no 
mark of Government approval inherent in the designation of a group as 
exempt. Congress has simply chosen not to tax a particular type of 
revenue because it is not within the scope [of income] sought to be 
taxed by the statute. ,,193 The court reached the opposite conclusion with 
respect to fraternal organizations because their tax exemption "operates 
of the activities of which are for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder." I.R.C. § 501(c)(7). Section 501(c)(8) 
exempts fraternal organizations "operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive 
benefit of the members of a fraternity itself operating under a lodge system ... and 
providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of 
such society, order, or association or their dependents." Id. § 501(c)(8). 
Section 170(c)(4) authorizes a deduction for contributions to fraternal organizations that 
are "used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational 
purposes." Id. § 170(c)(4). 
186. The plaintiff's three arguments were as follows: (1) the Internal Revenue 
Code's grant of certain tax benefits is unconstitutional, (2) the Code does not authorize 
such benefits, and (3) such benefits constitute FFA under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. MeGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 450. 
187. See id. at 461-62. 
188. Id. at 46l. 
189. Id. at 462. 
190. Id. at 457-59, 462. 
19l. Id. at 458. 
192. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 202 (citing MeGlotten, 338 
F. Supp. at 458). 
193. MeGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 458. 
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in fact as a subsidy in favor of the particular activities these groups are 
pursuing," 194 and was not "simply a way of defming taxable 
income. ,,195 Thus, under MeGlotten, a tax benefit will likely constitute 
FF A if Congress intended the benefit to constitute more than an 
"income-defining provision" and if the grant of the benefit is 
conditional on the benefiting organization limiting its activities to 
certain "government -specified purposes. ,,196 
Contrary to MeGlotten, the federal district court in Bachman v. 
American Society of Clinical Pathologists concluded that tax exemption 
alone did not constitute FF A for purposes of section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 197 In Bachman, the plaintiff sued the 
American Society of Clinical Pathologists, alleging that the 
organization's denial of her request for special testing conditions 
constituted discrimination against a handicapped person in violation of 
the Act. 198 Although the Society received no direct funding from the 
federal government, the plaintiff contended that it received "indirect 
financial assistance" in the form of its tax-exempt status. 199 
The court stated that, "[a]lthough tax exempt status confers a 
substantial economic advantage on [the Society], not every item of 
economic value granted by the federal government counts as financial 
assistance. ,,200 Relying on the "plain meaning" of the statute, the court 
concluded that "[t]he term 'assistance' connotes a transfer of 
government funds by way of subsidy, not merely an exemption from 
taxation. ,,201 In addition, the Bachman court also looked to cases, like 
Grove City College v. Bell, in which courts have applied Title IX based 
194. Id. at 462. 
195. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 203 (citing McGlotten, 338 
F. Supp. at 462). 
196. Id. at 203-04. 
197. 577 F. SUpp. 1257, 1264 (D.N.J. 1983). 
198. Id. at 1258. 
199. See id. at 1263. Although the Society was not receiving FFA at the time 
of the lawsuit, it nevertheless conceded that it received two grants from the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare during the period in which the plaintiff applied to 
take the examination. See id. at 1260. The court, however, determined that the plaintiff 
was not subject to discrimination under the program or activity for which the FF A was 
received. See id. at 1263 ("[Tlhe receipt of federal financial assistance by a mUltiperson 
entity, for specific application to certain programs or activities, does not, without more, 
bring all of those multiple programs or activities within the reach of section 504." 
(quoting Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760,767 (5th Cir.1981»). 
200. Id. at 1263. 
201. Id. at 1264. 
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on the educational institution's receipt of federal grants and student 
loans-not its tax-exempt status. 202 
Because Brennen advocated a more expansive application of the 
civil-rights laws to charitable organizations, he concluded that the 
broader interpretation of FF A in McGlotten and Grove City CoJJege 
was "the preferred method of interpretation in terms of maximizing 
protections to those persons whose federal civil rights are violated. ,,203 
Brennen argued that parties to a civil-rights suit would expend more 
time determining whether discrimination has occurred rather than 
discerning whether the organization had received the correct form of 
governmental assistance. 204 Notwithstanding the social-justice 
implications of a broader view of FF A, Brennen acknowledged that the 
lack of a Supreme Court decision specifying that certain tax benefits 
constitute FFA allows courts, like the Bachman court, to interpret the 
term narrowly and decline to impose civil-rights constraints on 
"nontraditional defendants. ,,205 Brennen reasoned that, if the tax benefit 
received by the defendant organization in Bachman was in the form of a 
government grant or loan, the plaintiff would have likely succeeded in 
her Rehabilitation Act c1aim.206 
Other than its general interpretation of FFA under the civil-rights 
laws, the Supreme Court has not specifically considered whether certain 
202. /d. at 1264-65 (citing Grove City Col/., 687 F.2d 684). Brennen has 
argued that the Baehman court's narrow interpretation of FFA is "clearly at odds" with 
the broader notion espoused by the Supreme Court in Grove City Call., in which the 
Court stated that 
[nlothing in [Title IXI suggests that Congress elevated form over suhstance 
by making the application of the nondiscrimination principle dependent on 
the manner in which a program or activity receives federal assistance. 
There is no hasis in [Title IXI for the view that only the institutions that 
themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks directly from the Federal 
Government are subject to regulation. As the Court of Appeals observed, 
"by its all inclusive terminology [Title IXI appears to encompass all forms 
of federal aid to education, direct or indirect." 
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, at 206 (quoting Grove City Col/., 465 U.S. at 564); see 
a/so Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1375 (citing Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. 
Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the /ntemal Revenue Code, 82 
YALE L.J. 51, 62 (1972) (observing that the "tax-subsidy rationale" employed in 
MeG/otten "has implications beyond the area of racial restrictions" and that subsidies 
could include exemptions from federal taxes other than income tax)). 
203. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 207. 
204. Seeid. 
205. See id. Brennen defined "nontraditional defendants" as "those civil rights 
defendants who are not state actors and who do not receive traditional forms of FFA 
like government loans or grants." /d at 207 n.206. 
206. /d. at 207. 
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tax benefits like tax exemption constitute FFA.207 The Court has, 
however, concentrated on the related issue of whether certain tax 
benefits should be considered government expenditures or government 
neutrality for constitutional-law purposes-that is, the well-known "tax 
expenditure" theory in federal income-tax law.208 
The primary question addressed by the tax-expenditure theory is 
whether the receipt of a tax benefit should be legally regarded as 
equivalent to a direct government grant of money. 209 Under the theory, 
an organization's section 501(c)(3) tax exemption is equivalent to a 
direct government outlay of cash.210 Similarly, the tax-expenditure 
theory treats the amount of a charitable-contributions deduction as 
equivalent to a direct government grant of money to the taxpayer 
claiming the deduction. 211 
The theory's equivalency "applies only to tax benefits enacted to 
implement social policy-not those intended as a further delineation of 
207. Id. at 173; cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
The grant of a [state propertyl tax exemption is not sponsorship since the 
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply 
abstains from demanding that the church support the state. No one has ever 
suggested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or 
hospitals into arms of the state or put employees "on the public payroll." 
There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of 
religion. 
Id. at 675. 
208. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 173, 208; see also infra 
note 215. 
209. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 208-09 (citing STANLEY S. 
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6-7, 30-49 
(1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1-30 (1985)). 
The federal . . . tax system consists . . . of two parts: one part comprises the 
structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax ... ; the second part 
comprises a system of tax expenditures under which . . . financial assistance 
programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct 
Government expenditures. 
Id. at 210 n.214 (quoting SURREY, supra, at 6). 
210. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 209. Courts have sometimes 
reached the same conclusion. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
of Washington, the Court held the following: 
Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is 
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same 
effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have 
to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of 
the amount of a portion of the individual's contributions. 
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 699 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
("[E]xemptions do not differ from subsidies as an economic matter. "). 
211. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 209. 
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the appropriate tax base. ,,212 For instance, when the MeGlotten social 
club received tax benefits, those benefits would not be equated with a 
government grant or loan because the club's exemption was not 
intended to effect any social policy. 213 Rather, the government simply 
chose not to tax that particular revenue stream. 214 Accordingly, under 
the tax-expenditure theory, a tax benefit that accomplishes a social 
purpose and a direct government outlay for the identical purpose are 
equivalent-for both economic and constitutional-law purposes. 215 
Although Brennen primarily accepted the economic-equivalence 
concept contained in the tax-expenditure theory to support his thesis, he 
appeared to join other scholars in limiting its impact in the 
constitutional-law context. 216 He contended that the application of 
economic equivalence to federal civil-rights law differs from application 
to constitutional law. 217 For example, federal or state involvement is 
crucial in determining whether a First Amendment violation occurs due 
to government funding. Such involvement is less critical, however, in 
applying federal civil-rights laws, in which the primary inquiries focus 
on whether the existence of government funding to a private individual 
or entity is significant and "whether Congress intended that the 
financial benefit support the private party's activities.,,218 Brennen 
ultimately concluded that "tax expenditure theory can and should be 
used to equate tax benefits received by charities with government grants 
212. Id at 209-10 (citing SURREY, supra note 209, at 6). 
213. Id. at 227. 
214. See id.; see also supra notes 19189-92 and accompanying text. 
215. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 210. For example, while a 
church's income-tax exemption may be economically equivalent to the receipt of a 
direct government grant under the tax-expenditure theory, the two benefits may not be 
similarly permissible under constitutional-law principles. The direct government grant 
may be seen as violating the Establishment Clause, whereas the government's grant of a 
tax exemption may be seen as neutral, and thus constitutionally permissible. See Walz, 
397 U.S. at 674-76 (holding that an exemption from state property tax for property 
owned by churches and used solely for religious worship did not violate the 
Establishment Clause). The Court characterized such exemptions as "benevolent 
neutrality" that neither advanced nor inhibited religion and created only a minimal and 
remote "entanglement" between church and state. See id 
216. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 210 (citing Edward A. 
Zelinksy, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 
HARV. L. REv. 379 (1998); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional 
Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407 (1999». 
217. See id at 224. 
218. Id; see also Galvin & Devins, supra note 34, at 1376 ("[AI tax exemption 
might be permissible under the establishment clause but impermissible under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. "). 
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and loans received by various private parties. ,,219 In other words, a 
charitable organization's income tax exemption should constitute FFA 
for purposes of subjecting that organization to federal civil-rights laws. 
2. CRITIQUE OF THE EXPANSION APPROACH 
While Brennen's expansion approach is undeniably persuasive and 
viable, the proposal's very weakness is its reliance on civil-rights laws 
to combat ongoing discrimination by charitable organizations. Current 
civil-rights laws have limited application, as they only protect against 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national or ethnic origin, 
religion, sex, age, and disability. These do not prohibit discrimination 
on the bases of sexual orientation220 or marital status221 -both of which 
appear to be common forms of discrimination currently engaged in by 
charitable organizations.222 Although Brennen referred to discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation as "harmful discriminatory 
behavior, ,,223 he failed to further explain how his proposal to expand the 
application of civil-rights laws would combat this behavior. Moreover, 
Brennen's proposal confronts an additional hurdle by relying on a more 
expansive interpretation of FFA. The Supreme Court, however, has not 
determined that FFA should include tax benefits, and lower courts are 
219. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 224-25; see also Galvin & 
Devins, supra note 342, at 1378 n.118 (" [Tlax exemptions are government aid for 
purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. "). 
220. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(" Although congressional inaction subsequent to the enactment of a statute is not always 
a helpful guide, Congress's refusal to expand the reach of Title VII is strong evidence 
of congressional intent in the face of consistent judicial decisions refusing to interpret 
'sex' to include sexual orientation."); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 
138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination 
based upon sexual orientation."); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 
69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against 
homosexuals."); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,329-30 (9th Cir. 
1979) ("Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on 
the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference 
such as homosexuality. "). 
221. See, e.g., Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 
1204 (lOth Cir. 1997) ("Title VII prohibits employers from treating married women 
differently than married men, but it does not protect marital status alone. "); Fisher v. 
Vassar Coil., 70 F.3d 1420, 1447 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Mlarital status alone is not a 
ground for bringing a suit under Title VlI. "); Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 F. Supp. 
2d 963, 967 (N .D. Ill. 1999). 
222. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text. Unless reported in the press 
or discussed in a court decision, the type and frequency of alleged or actual 
discrimination by charitable organizations cannot be verified. 
223. See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 169. 
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not in agreement, as illustrated by the decisions in MeGlotten and 
Bachman. 224 
Until the Supreme Court rules on these issues directly, the use of 
civil-rights laws to combat discrimination fails to comprehensively 
address the problem. Furthermore, the canons of statutory 
interpretation lend credence to the argument that, if Congress intended 
to extend the nondiscrimination provisions in the civil-rights laws to 
charitable organizations, it would have done so by including specific 
language in the statutes or by directing the promulgation of 
administrative rcgulations. 225 As stated by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in a case attempting to expand civil-rights protection granted 
by Title VII, Congressional inaction can be "strong evidence of 
congressional intent. ,,226 
Unfortunately, despite the merits of Brennen's proposal, it does 
not reflect current reality. Even if courts interpreted FFA broadly 
enough to encompass tax benefits, such as exemption and the charitable 
contributions deduction, current civil-rights laws would not prohibit 
charitable organizations from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation and marital status. To truly abolish discrimination by 
charitable organizations, Congress needs to expand these laws to 
expressly prohibit discrimination on such bases. Congressional intent 
must exist to prohibit this discrimination by all private actors, but such 
intent is dubious at best. A specific legislative response could prove to 
be more effective in preventing federal public monies from being 
utilized by charitable organizations to discriminate against classes of 
citizens. 
IV. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 501(c)(3) TO ESTABLISH A 
NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT FOR TAX EXEMPTION 
Federal income-tax law does not explicitly address or proscribe the 
ostensibly common practice of discrimination by charitable 
organizations.227 The only possible restraint on discrimination exists in 
the public-policy doctrine established by Bob Jones University, which is 
riddled with limitations, including the lack of a clearly defined source 
of "established public policy. ,,228 Current civil-rights laws are also 
limited in their application and do not prohibit the seemingly common 
224. See supra notes 184 & 201 and accompanying text. 
225. See generally Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(2006). This Article's proposal could be similarly criticized. 
226. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). 
227. See supra notes 14-28, 31 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. 
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bases of discrimination by charitable organizations-sexual orientation 
and marital statuS.229 Accordingly, the existing deficiencies in current 
federal law effectively sanction most discrimination by charitable 
organizations . 
A. The Nondiscrimination-Requirement Proposal 
In light of these problems, it seems that the most effective and 
comprehensive solution to eliminate discrimination by charitable 
organizations is the enactment of a broad and well-defined 
nondiscrimination requirement in section 50l(c)(3). Inherent in this 
proposal is the notion that any discrimination by a charitable 
organization is intrinsically incompatible with that organization's 
charitable purpose and mission. This nondiscrimination provision 
should be based on currently existing language in the civil-rights laws, 
but should be expanded to include the bases on which charitable 
organizations most commonly discriminate. Because the provision 
appears in a federal income-tax-exemption statute, Congress may be 
more open to such an expanded prohibition because its applicability 
would be limited to nonprofit organizations-not for-profit, private 
actors. Congress could institute this proposal by adding a subparagraph 
to section 50l(c)(3) similar to the following: 
No organization described under subsection (c)(3) shall 
exclude from participation in, deny the benefits of, or subject 
to discrimination under, any of its programs or activities, 
including its employment practices, any person in the United 
States on the basis of race, color, national or ethnic origin, 
sex or gender, age, handicap, disability, religion, marital 
status, or sexual orientation. 230 
Many reasons support the proposal set forth above. By not relying 
on an ill-defined public-policy doctrine or the questionable applicability 
of the civil-rights laws, a nondiscrimination requirement in section 
50l(c)(3) offers a more comprehensive solution. Furthermore, by 
setting forth the requirement directly in the statute that grants tax-
exempt status, Congress would send a strong message to potential and 
existing charitable organizations that discriminatory policies and 
practices are fundamentally inconsistent with a tax-exempt status under 
229. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
230. See infra note 325 and accompanying text for possible exceptions to this 
nondiscrimination requirement. This proposed text is not intended to be so specific that 
it implicitly excludes applicability to other types of discrimination. 
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section 501(c)(3). Instead, nondiscriminatory practices and policies 
comport with the commonly accepted notion of being "charitable" and 
conferring public benefit. 231 
More importantly, a statutory prohibition on discrimination would 
transform section 501(c)(3) into the "gold standard" for all 
organizations exempt from federal income tax. Because a corresponding 
benefit of a section 501(c)(3) tax exemption is the ability to provide 
donors with a charitable-contributions deduction under section 170,232 
such a transformation would ensure that the charities' beneficiaries are 
as diverse and all encompassing as the taxpaying public from which 
such organizations draw their support. In other words, the flow of tax-
deductible dollars generated by section 170 should not be used to 
discriminate against a particular segment of society because the 
significant cost of providing such tax benefit-estimated to be $232 
billion over the next five years-is borne by all taxpayers.233 
In line with these arguments, the IRS's grant of a section 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt status arguably creates a social contract between the 
organization, the government, and taxpayers. Although this social-
contract concept alone does not constitute a legally enforceable 
obligation,234 it suggests that there are certain purposes and activities 
that society attributes to a "charitable" organization. In contrast, some 
actions-such as discrimination-do not comport with society's notion 
of what constitutes a charity and, thus, violate or undermine this social 
contract. A charitable organization's violation could cause a shift in the 
231. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (arguing that a federal public 
policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status either 
already exists or is currently evolving). See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, The 
Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 
947, 977 (2005) ("[C]haritics primarily produce community income. In theory, 
charities exist for no reason other than to benefit the community. "). 
232. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
233. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 291 tb1.19-2; see also 
ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN & MARK SUSSMAN, TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT No. 137, 
CHARITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE GIFTS 7 (2005), http://www.taxfoundation.org/ 
files/sr137.pdf ("The charitable deduction shifts part of the cost of private charitable 
giving onto the rest of society. "). 
234. Social-contract theory should not be equated with assertions made by 
litigants in recent cases that an "express or implied contract arises between an 
organization and the federal governmcnt" upon the granting of exempt status under 
section 501(c)(3). HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 5.5(g) (Supp. 2006) ("The principal 
contention in this regard has been that tax exemption accorded to hospitals gives rise to 
a contract obligating the exempt hospital to provide medical care to uninsured patients 
without regard to their ability to pay for the care. This assertion, however, has been 
uniformly rejected." (citations omitted». Similarly, tax exemption does not create third-
party beneficiaries to any such implied contract. Id. § 5.5(h)-(i). 
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public's perception and support, leading to a decrease in the receipt of 
donations and other financial support. For instance, the United Way of 
the National Capital Area's publicized financial scandal235 and the Boy 
Scouts of America's exposed ban on homosexual members caused both 
organizations to suffer adverse financial consequences.236 Finally, the 
Supreme Court alluded to the existence of a social contract in 
explaining its expansive view of "charitable" under section 501(c)(3) in 
Bob Jones University: 
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions 
all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or 
deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be 
said to be indirect and vicarious "donors. " Charitable 
exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity 
confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the 
community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or 
which supplements and advances the work of public 
institutions already supported by tax revenues. History 
buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption 
under [section] 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a 
category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve 
and be in harmony with the public interest. The institution's 
purpose must not be so at odds with the common community 
conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might 
otherwise be conferred. 237 
As demonstrated by the social-contract concept, discrimination is at 
odds with the common community conscience and the notion of what 
constitutes a charity; therefore, it undermines any public benefit that 
235. See Jacqueline L. Salmon, Area United Way's Ex-Chief Admits $500,000 
Fraud, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at Bl. 
236. See, e.g., Brad Wolverton, D.C. United Way Leader Sentenced to Jail 
Time, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 17,2004, http://philanthropy.comJfree/update/ 
2004/0512004051701.htrn (noting that the United Way of the Capital Area received 
only $38 million in private donations during fundraising campaign of 2003 to 2004, 
compared to $90 million in 2001); Robert Strauss, They're Mad as HeJl, and They're 
Not Making Donations Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,2003, at F17 (reporting that 
the United Way of Southeastern Pennsylvania discontinued its funding of Boy Scouts' 
inner-city program because of the organization's discriminatory policy towards 
homosexuals); Steve Barnes, Texas: A United Way and Boy Scouts Part Company, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at AI8 (reporting that the United Way of Austin 
eliminated its annual funding of the local Boy Scouts because the of the Boy Scouts' 
exclusion of gay youths). 
237. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983) (citations 
omitted). 
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such charities otherwise confer. Accordingly, in light of such 
discriminatory practices or policies, these charities should no longer be 
considered "charitable" or receive tax exemptions under section 
501(c)(3). 
It is possible that narrowing the scope of section 501(c)(3) could 
result in a reduction in the number of organizations that qualify for tax-
exemptions. Nevertheless, with approximately 1.1 million 
organizations-with assets exceeding $1.9 trillion238 -currently enjoying 
section 501(c)(3) tax exemptions,239 many commentators have proposed 
alternatives to the current tax-exemption scheme that could effectively 
limit the number of charitable organizations. 24o Of course, "Such a 
position . . . would cut a very wide swath through current exempt 
organizations ... but it would end the current uncertainty. ,,241 
238. Diane Freda, Latest IRS Statistics Show Assets of Charitable 
Organizations Increasing, DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 28, 2006, at G-5. 
239. I.R.S., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2005 DATA BOOK 40 tbl.22 (2005), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf. The IRS granted section 501(c)(3) tax 
exemptions to 63,402 organizations in the 2005 fiscal year. Id. at 39 tbl.21. The total 
number of these exempt organizations exempt is actually larger than the 1.046 million 
reported by the IRS because "certain organizations, such as churches, integrated 
auxiliaries, subordinate units, and conventions or associations of churches, need not 
apply for recognition of tax-exemption, unless they specifically request a ruling." Id. at 
40 n.l. In addition, the IRS does not require such organizations to file annual 
information returns. Id. 
240. See, e.g., Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical 
Analysis of America's Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2491-92 
(2005) (proposing a different definition of charity). Professor Thomas Kelley proposed 
dividing "charity" into two distinct categories: (1) a "vulgar" charity, "whose missions 
and resources are devoted eXClusively to serving the poor," and which is subject to a 
permissive destination-of-income test so as to more liberally earn support for its cause, 
id. at 2490-91; and (2) nonvulgar charities that are currently regarded as "public benefit 
organizations" under section 501(c)(3). Id. at 2490. 
Professor John Colombo argued that, in cases in which nonprofit entities provide 
"commercially similar" services to for-profit entities, as well as in other instances, the 
primary section 501(c)(3) criterion should be one of "enhancing access"-namely, 
whether the organization provides access to services to underserved populations, or 
services to the general popUlation not otherwise provided by for-profit entities. John D. 
Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343 
(2004); see also Borek, supra note 63, at 222 (proposing the "decoupling" of the 
charitable-contributions deduction and exemption and the redefining of "charitable" 
from a "catch-all category of exempt activities not otherwise delineated" to a term 
"reserved for organizations the primary purpose of which is to benefit the poor"); Lars 
G. Gustafsson, The Definition of "Charitable" for Federal Income Tax Purposes: 
Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33 Hous. L. 
REV. 587, 647 (1996) ("It is one thing for a society to recognize (and, in some cases to 
tolerate) an organization's existence; it is a far different matter to require society to 
financially support, even indirectly, that organization. "). 
241. Colombo, supra note 240, at 386. 
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Ultimately, if the IRS denies or revokes a section 501(c)(3) 
exemption due to a nondiscrimination violation, the offending 
organization may still qualify under section 501(c)(4) as a "social 
welfare" organization. 242 Donations to social-welfare organizations, 
however, do not qualify for the charitable-contributions deduction 
under section 170.243 Nevertheless, this would prevent charitable 
organizations from using the tax-deductible dollars they receive to 
discriminate against members of society. 
B. Difficulties and Potential Criticisms 
This nondiscrimination-requirement proposal should not preclude 
necessary discussion of the real problem of discrimination by charitable 
organizations. Rather, its purpose is to raise awareness and to offer a 
more comprehensive solution. Because it is a new legal concept, the 
nondiscrimination requirement may be difficult to apply to the existing 
tax-exempt-organization community. 
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES 
One of the major criticisms of this proposal would likely mirror 
those lobbied against the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Dale 
v. Boy Scouts of America-namely, that a broad nondiscrimination 
242. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 
540, 544 (1983); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
Section 501(c)(4)(A) grants tax-exempt status to 
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of 
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a 
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net 
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or 
recreational purposes. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2000). In upholding the section 501(c)(3) lobbying and political-
campaign restrictions, the Supreme Court relies heavily on the availability of an 
affiliated section 50I(c)(4) organization as an alternate means of communication. See 
supra notes 261-62; infra notes 279-80. This Article employs the Court's reasoning to 
support the nondiscrimination-requirement proposal. One could argue, however, that 
discriminatory policies or practices conflict with the regulatory definition of social 
welfare: 
An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare 
if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and 
general welfare of the people of the community. An organization embraced 
within this section is one which is operated primarily for the purpose of 
bringing about civic betterments and social improvements. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990). 
243. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c)(1)-(2). 
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requirement in section 501(c)(3) violates an organization's First 
Amendment rights,244 because it "would significantly affect ... [an 
organization's] ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. ,,245 
While the U. S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed this particular 
issue,246 it has upheld other restrictions on charitable organizations' 
activities as conditions to exemption under section 501(c)(3), and has 
dismissed claims that such restrictions violated an organization's First 
Amendment rights. 247 It is important to note that that tax exemption is 
typically viewed as a congressional grant, not a constitutional right. 248 
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, a 
nonprofit organization's stated mission was to promote what it 
perceived to be the "public interest" in the area of federal taxation. 249 
Two other nonprofit corporations-one of which had tax-exempt status 
under section 501(c)(3) and the other of which had tax-exempt status 
under section 501(c)(4)-merged to form Taxation With Representation 
of Washington (TWR).250 In denying TWR's application for exemption 
under section 501(c)(3), the IRS determined that a substantial part of 
TWR's activities would consist of attempting to influence legislation in 
violation of the "no substantial part" statutory limitation on lobbying 
activities. 251 In addressing TWR's argument that the lobbying limitation 
violated its First Amendment rights,252 the Court first explained that 
"[b]oth tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that 
244. See, e.g., Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, The Boy Scouts, Freedom 
of Association, and the Right to Discriminate: A Legal, Philosophical, and Economic 
Analysis, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 851, 882 (2004) ("Freedom of association is a 
necessary condition of a civilized order; laws prohibiting discrimination violate this 
freedom and must be repealed."); Erez Reuveni, On Boy Scouts and Anti-
Discrimination Law: The Associational Rights of Quasi-Religious Organizations, 86 
B.U. L. REv. 109, 113 (2006) (contending that "quasi-religious" organizations like the 
Boy Scouts deserve "greater associational protections" under the First Amendment than 
purely secular organizations); Christopher Ramey, Revealing the Inadequacy of ABI7: 
How Dictating MorajJity Upon Faith-Based Organizations Will Wreak Havoc on 
California's Economy, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 125 (2003) (criticizing California's 
proposed legislation which required employers with state contracts valued at $100,000 
or more to provide the same benefits to spouses and domestic partners of employees, 
because it imposed on the moral convictions of faith-based organizations that contracted 
with the State). 
245. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000). 
246. See Brennen, supra note 134, at 843. 
247. See id. at 843-44. 
248. See Christian Echoes Nat'! Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 
857 (10th Cir. 1972). 
249. 461 U.S. 540,541-42 (1983). 
250. See id. at 543. 
251. Id. at 542 (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000)). 
252. Seeid 
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is administered through the tax system," analogizing such benefits to 
cash grants to the organization. 253 The Court further clarified that 
"Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose not 
to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations undertake to 
promote the public welfare. ,,254 
The Court agreed with TWR's assertion that "the government may 
not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional 
right. ,,255 It noted, however, that the Internal Revenue Code did not 
restrict TWR's ability to receive deductible contributions in support of 
its nonlobbying activities,256 but that "Congress has merely refused to 
pay for lobbying out of public moneys. ,,257 The Regan Court further 
rejected the "notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully 
realized unless they are subsidized by the State. ,,258 
Significantly, the Regan Court reminded TWR that it still qualified 
for a tax exemption under section 501 (c)(4) as a social-welfare 
organization, and that it could obtain deductible contributions for its 
nonlobbying activities by returning to the dual structure from which it 
originated. 259 The Court did, however, caution that TWR needed to 
ensure that the charitable organization did not subsidize the section 
253. Id. at 544. 
254. Id The Court also dismissed TWR's argument that the lobbying limitation 
violated its equal protection rights under the Due Process Clause. See id at 542. 
Additionally, the Court found that it was rational for Congress to decide to subsidize 
lobbying by veterans' organizations, even though it chose not to subsidize substantial 
lobbying by other charities. See id. at 551. The Court explained that veterans bave 
"been obliged to drop their own affairs and take up the burdens of the nation," id 
(quoting Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561,575 (1943», and that the United States has 
a long tradition of "compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing 
them with numerous advantages." Id (citing Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
279 n.25 (1979». 
255. Id at 545. 
256. See id 
257. Id; see also id at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 
(1959) (involving a Treasury Regulation that forbade business deductions for lobbying 
expenses». 
258. Id at 546 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, 1., concurring». 
The [charitable organization] may engage in [lobbying and political-
campaign intervention] activities without restraint, subject, however, to 
withholding of the exemption or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain 
from such activities and obtain the privilege of exemption. . . . The 
taxpayer may opt to enter an area of federal employment subject to the 
restraints and limitations upon his First Amendment rights. Conversely, he 
may opt not to receive employment funds at the public trough in the areas 
covered by the restraints and thus exercise his First Amendment rights 
unfettered. 
Christian I?choes Nat'l Miuistry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,857 (1972). 
259. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
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501(c)(4) entity, "otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity 
Congress chose not to subsidize. ,,260 
In his concurrence, Justice Harry Blackmun noted that "[section] 
501(c)(3) organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to 
petition the Government" and agreed with the majority that a section 
501(c)(3) organization can preserve both its tax exemption and its free 
speech rights by utilizing an affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization to 
carry out its lobbying pursuits. 261 Nevertheless, JOstice Blackmun still 
cautioned that 
[s]hould the IRS attempt to limit the control these 
organizations exercise over the lobbying of their 501(c)(4) 
affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be 
insurmountable. It hardly answers one person's objection to a 
restriction on his speech that another person, outside his 
control, may speak for him. . . . Similarly, an attempt to 
prevent [section] 501(c)( 4) organizations from lobbying 
explicitly on behalf of their [section] 501(c)(3) affiliates would 
perpetuate [section] 501(c)(3) organizations' inability to make 
known their views on legislation without incurring the 
unconstitutional penalty. Such refusals would extend far 
beyond Congress'[s] mere refusal to subsidize lobbying.262 
In other words, section 501(c)(4) provides a constitutional safety 
hatch when imposing restrictions on the activities and possible 
constitutional rights of charitable organizations.263 Less than two 
decades after Regan, the D.C. Circuit adopted this very approach in 
addressing a violation of the political-activities prohibition in section 
501(c)(3).264 In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, the plaintiff-a tax-
260. /d. To do so, the two entities should be "separately incorporated and keep 
records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for 
lobbying." /d. at 544 n.6. 
261. /d. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
262. /d 
263. Brennen has acknowledged that his proposal-expanding the applicability 
of federal civil-rights laws to charitable organizations-was not intended to apply to tax 
benefits granted to "noncharities" (for example, business leagues exempt under 
section 501(c)(6)) because they "are inappropriate objects of taxation and, hence, are 
not exempt for social policy reasons. Accordingly, these noncharitable mutual benefit 
organizations that are exempt from income tax do not receive the type of tax benefit 
that, under tax expenditure theory, is equivalent to a direct grant of government funds." 
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 30, at 225-26. 
264. Section 501(c)(3) provides that an exempt organization cannot "participate 
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
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exempt church conducting business as the Church at Pierce Creek 
(CPC)-placed a full-page advertisement in two newspapers four days 
before the 1992 presidential election. 265 The advertisements urged 
Christians to vote against the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton because 
of his "positions on certain moral issues. ,,266 Each advertisement 
attributed cosponsorship to CPC and solicited tax-deductible donations 
in support of its cause.267 In response, the IRS invoked a statutorily 
prescribed church-tax inquirl68 followed by a church-tax 
examination. 269 Ultimately concluding that the placement of the 
advertisements violated the statutory prohibition on political-campaign 
activity, the IRS revoked CPC's section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt statuS.270 
CPC challenged the revocation, alleging that the revocation violated its 
free exercise and free speech rights under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 and the First Amendment. 271 
In response to CPC's free exercise claim, the D.C. Circuit found 
that CPC failed to establish that the revocation had substantially 
burdened its free exercise rights and that the government lacked a 
compelling interest justifying such a burden. 272 The court further 
concluded that CPC's loss of its exemption for violating the political-
campaign prohibition did not constitute an unconstitutional burden on 
its free exercise rights. This would only be true, explained the court, 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2000). 
265. 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
266. ld. Each advertisement displayed the headline "Christians Beware" and 
declared that Clinton's stances on abortion, homosexuality, and the distribution of 
condoms to teenage students were contrary to the Bible. ld. at 140. 
267. ld. at 140. 
268. See id. Specific statutory rules govern the IRS's ability to audit churches. 
See I.R.C. § 7611. A "church tax inquiry" may only be initiated by an appropriate IRS 
official (typically, a regional commissioner or person of higher rank within the IRS) 
who "reasonably believes, on the basis of facts and circumstances recorded in writing, 
that the organization may not qualify for tax exemption as a church" because of certain 
nonexempt activities. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 24.8, at 711; I.R.C. § 7611(a)(l)(A), 
(2). 
269. See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140; I.R.C. § 7611 (h)(3). 
270. See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140. 
271. ld. at 140-41. 
272. See id. at 142 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 
493 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1990) ("[TJhe free exercise inquiry asks whether government 
has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or 
practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. "»; 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) to (b) (2000), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997) (providing that the government can only substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion if that burden is "in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering" that interest). 
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"if the receipt of the privilege (in this case the tax exemption) is 
conditioned 'upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or . . . 
denie[d] ... because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and 
to violate his beliefs. ,,,273 The court concluded that the only effect of the 
revocation would be to "decrease the amount of money available to the 
Church for its religious practices. The Supreme Court has declared, 
however, that such a burden 'is not constitutionally significant. ",274 
Furthermore, the court found that CPC's alleged burden was 
"overstated" because churches receive "unique treatment" under the 
Code, thereby rendering the revocation's impact "more symbolic than 
substantial. ,>275 
In relying on Regan, the D.C. Circuit concluded that CPC had "an 
alternate means of communication" through the formation and 
operation of an affiliated organization exempt under section 
501(c)(4).276 The court explained that, while they are subject to a 
similar ban on political-campaign actiVIties, section 50 I (c)(4) 
organizations may form a political-action committee that can participate 
in political campaigns without limitation. 277 Still, the court reminded 
CPC that it could not channel its tax-deductible contributions to fund 
the political-action committee, because Congress chose not to subsidize 
such First Amendment activities. 278 
As in Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Regan-which deemed 
the availability of a section 501(c)(4) organization as an alternate means 
of communication to be "essential to the constitutionality of section 
501(c)(3)'s restrictions on lobbying,,279-Branch Ministries relied on 
273. Id. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391-92). 
274. Id. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391); see also 
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) ("[P]etitioners' claimed exemption 
stems from the contention that an incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their 
religious activities. This argument knows no limitation. "). 
275. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142. The court further explained that, if 
CPC did not intervene in future political campaigns, "it [could] hold itself out as a 
501(c)(3) organization and receive all the benefits of that status. All that [would be] 
lost, in that event, is the advance assurance of deductibility in the event a donor should 
be audited." Id. at 142-43. 
276. See id. at 143 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 
461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983». 
277. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(t) to (g) (1980». The court reminded 
CPC that the "related [section] 501(c)(4) organization must be separately incorporated; 
and it must maintain records that will demonstrate that tax-deductible contributions to 
the Church have not been used to support the political activities conducted by the 
[section] 501(c)(4) organization's political action arm." Id. 
278. Id. at 143-44 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548). 
279. Id. at 143 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring». 
94 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
this availability to sustain the constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)'s 
prohibition on political-campaign activities. 280 Accordingly, it seems 
probable that these alternate means of communication might be of 
similar utility in sustaining the constitutionality of a nondiscrimination 
requirement in section 501(c)(3). As with the lobbying and political-
campaign restrictions, a charitable organization would be free to 
discriminate in the activities conducted within a section 501(c)(4) 
affiliate without jeopardizing its tax benefits as to its nondiscriminatory 
activities. 
2. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PLURALISM 
A corresponding criticism of the constitutionality issue is the 
contention that a nondiscrimination requirement in section 501(c)(3) 
would effectively stifle open and diverse dialogue on controversial 
topics like sexual orientation. Specifically, such a requirement would 
squelch the "pluralism" implicit in the existence and purposes of the 
nonprofit sector. The Boy Scouts made a similar argument in its brief, 
stating that "American pluralism thrives on difference [and that] 
controversial questions of personal morality, often involving religious 
conviction, are best tested and resolved within the private marketplace 
of ideas, and not as the subject of government-imposed orthodoxy. ,,281 
While it is important to acknowledge the values of pluralism and 
"autonomy of diverse groups," it is not axiomatic "that these values 
should always take priority over the effort to break up entrenched 
patterns of discrimination and include, in socially valued activities, 
people who have traditionally been outcasts. ,,282 Because of the negative 
effects of discrimination on homosexuals, particularly gay youth, any 
concerted effort to prevent such harm should not be viewed as "a trivial 
state interest. ,,283 Furthermore, as demonstrated by Regan and Branch 
Ministries, a charitable organization like the Boy Scouts can preserve 
its free speech rights by forming and effectively controlling a section 
501(c)(4) social-welfare organization, which would not be subject to a 
nondiscrimination requirement. 284 
Regardless of which side one takes on the provocative issue of 
pluralism, the more pertinent question remains whether the government 
should permit charitable organizations to use the tax-deductible dollars 
280. 
281. 
(2000). 
282. 
283. 
284. 
See id. 
Brief for Petitioner at 45, 47, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
Koppelman, supra note 150, at 1835-36 (citations omitted). 
Jd. 
See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
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they receive to achieve that pluralism at the cost of discriminating 
against a particular segment of society. 285 While the nondiscrimination-
requirement proposal would create the "gold standard" of tax-exempt 
status, it does not completely thwart pluralism. Rather, to truly effect 
pluralism, organizations with discriminatory policies or practices can 
still retain tax-exempt status under section 501 (c)(4) or another 
applicable subsection of section 501(c); members of these 
discriminatory organizations would suffer the only cost-the loss of the 
section 170 charitable-contributions deductions. 
3. APPLICABILITY TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
Although perplexing, the issue of applying the nondiscrimination-
requirement proposal to religious organizations is especially pertinent in 
that many instances of alleged or actual discrimination by charitable 
organizations involve church-affiliated or -owned schools, universities, 
and service providers. 286 As such, it is crucial to understand the 
exemption of religious organizations, including churches. 
a. Overview of the Religious Exemption 
Section 501(c)(3) provides a tax exemption to an entity organized 
and operated exclusively for a religious purpose. 287 Federal income-tax 
law, however, fails to define the terms "religious" and "religion" in its 
statutes and regulations, due primarily to First Amendment concerns. 288 
Religious organizations are generally defined more broadly than just 
"churches" or "traditional houses of worship," and can include book 
publishers, broadcasters, and cemeteries. 289 To further complicate 
matters, the exempt purposes listed in section 501(c)(3) are not 
"mutually exclusive"; in other words, a "separately incorporated 
parochial school may be both 'religious' and 'educational,' and many 
typical 'charitable' activities may be under the control or sponsorship of 
a particular religion or church. ,,290 The IRS is acutely aware of the 
constitutional ramifications of attempting to define "religion" or 
285. See generally Gene Steuerle, Reform and Equal Justice, 111 TAX NOTES 
343 (2006) (discussing the promotion of equal justice in tax law and the increased role 
that both the courts and legislatures should play). 
286. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text. 
287. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i)(a) (as 
amended 1990). 
288. See HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 8.2(a), at 227. 
289. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 444 (3d ed. 2006). 
290. [d. at 444-45. 
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"religious" narrowly, and has advised its agents to interpret the terms 
broadly to "encompass ... even those sects that do not believe in a 
Supreme Being. ,,291 Accordingly, the IRS has subscribed to this general 
rule: "in the absence of a clear showing that beliefs or doctrines under 
consideration are not sincerely held by those professing or claiming 
them as a religion, the Service cannot question the 'religious' nature of 
those beliefs. ,,292 In fact, the IRS has typically deuied religious-
organization exemptions on other grounds, such as the section 501(c)(3) 
private-inurement prohibition293 or the section 501(c)(3) lobbying and 
political-campaign restrictions. 294 
Although it cannot question or regulate religious belief and 
opinions, Congress can regulate religious action and practices. 295 In 
Reynolds v. Umted States, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law 
criminalizing the practice of polygamy. 296 In holding that citizens were 
not excepted from the statute because of their religious beliefs, the 
Court explained that, "while [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices. ,,297 In a subsequent case 
involving a state statute that regulated solicitation by charitable 
organizations, the Court elaborated on Reynolds by stating that "the 
[First] Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the 
291. Jd. at 445; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977) 
(fmding that a witches' coven qualified as a church under section 50l(c)(3». 
292. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977); see also Holy Spirit 
Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 435 N.E.2d 662,668 
(N. Y. 1982) ("It is for the religious bodies themselves, rather than the courts or 
administrative agencies, to define, by their teachings and activities, what their religion 
is. The courts are obliged to accept such characterization ... unless it is found to be 
insincere or [al sham. "). 
293. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
294. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 
F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972) (involving the revocation of an organization's exempt status 
because it failed to meet the operational test and violated lobbying and political-
campaign restrictions); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(addressing a church's political-campaign-prohibition violation); Unitary Mission 
Church of Long Island v. Comm'r, 74 T.e. 507 (1980), afrd647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 
1981) (upholding the denial of a church's exemption because of the private benefit and 
inurement to the organization's controlling members); see also United States v. Kuch, 
288 F. Supp. 439, 444 (D.D.C. 1968) (determining that the organization at issue was 
not "religious" because it was clearly motivated by the "desire to use drugs and to 
enjoy drugs for their own sake"). 
295. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 289, at 453. 
296. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
297. Jd. at 166. 
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second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the 
protection of society. ,,298 
Although the same congressional and IRS trepidation with respect 
to religious belief is present in attempting to define a "church, ,,299 some 
designation is necessary because of the unique treatment and protection 
that churches receive under the Code.3°O In making these designations, 
the IRS follows a fifteen-item checklisfol-including a distinct legal 
existence, a recognized creed and form of worship, a formal code of 
doctrine and discipline, a distinct religious history, and the selection of 
ordained ministers after prescribed studies. 302 Although the IRS has 
cautioned that these criteria are not exclusive and that it ultimately uses 
a facts-and-circumstances determination,303 the criterion that courts 
most consistently rely on in determining the existence of a church is the 
presence or absence of an established and regular congregation304: "In 
looking for a congregation, the central focus is whether the 
organization's membership is a coherent group of individuals or 
families that join together to accomplish religious purposes or shared 
298. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). At issue in the 
case was a state statute that prohibited the solicitation of contributions by religious, 
charitable, or philanthropic causes without obtaining official approval. See id. at 301-
02. The Court ultimately concluded that such approval constituted an invalid prior 
constraint on the free exercise of religion. See id. at 307. 
299. See HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 8.3, at 237. 
300. See infra notes 308-310 and accompanying text. 
301. See ROBERT LOUTHIAN & THOMAS MILLER, I.R.S., DEFINING "CHURCH": 
THE CONCEPT OF A CONGREGATION 2 (1993), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ 
eotopica94.pdf. The fifteen points are as follows: 
(a) a distinct legal existence, (b) a recognized creed and form of worship, 
(c) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (d) a formal code of 
doctrine and discipline, (e) a distinct religious history, (0 a membership not 
associated with any other church or denomination, (g) an organization of 
ordained ministers, (h) ordained ministers selected after completing 
prescribed studies, (i) a literature of its own, (j) established places of 
worship, (k) regular congregations, (I) regular religious services, (m) 
Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young, (n) schools for the 
preparation of its ministers, and (0) any other facts and circumstances that 
may bear upon the organization's claim for church status. 
Id In instructing that the criteria "are not exclusive and are not to be mechanically 
applied," the IRS Chief Counsel recommended the addition of the fifteenth criterion. 
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,982 (May 3, 1983). Federal courts adopted the original 
fourteen-point test in American Guidance Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 490 F. 
Supp. 304, 306 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980). 
302. LOUTHIAN & MILLER, supra note 301, at 2. 
303. Id. 
304. Id at 3 ("At a minimum, a church includes a body of believers or 
communicants that assembles regularly in order to worship." (quoting Am. Guidance 
Found., 490 F. Supp. at 306». 
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beliefs. The size of the congregation is less important than its 
dynamic. ,,305 
Although nearly all religious organizations are eligible for a tax 
exemption under section 501(c)(3), only "churches, their integrated 
auxiliaries and conventions or associations of churches" are presumed 
not to be private foundations,306 and thus, excepted from the notice 
requirements of section 508. 307 That is, a church does not need to file 
an application for the IRS to recognize it as exempt under section 
501(c)(3).308 Churches are also relieved from filing annual information 
returns with the IRS.309 In addition, the Internal Revenue Code confers 
upon churches special procedural safeguards with respect to IRS 
examinations or audits. 310 Moreover, churches are exempted from 
certain rules governing qualified retirement plans, and social security, 
self-employment, and withholding taxes. 311 
A particular church's activities typically comprise more than just 
providing religious services and worship to its congregants. Many 
churches also operate schools, seminaries, or social-service agencies 
without creating a separate legal entity. 312 Until a church makes an 
activity part of a separate legal entity, the IRS considers it to be a 
component of the church and therefore covered by the church's 
exemption. 313 Once the church forms a new legal entity to conduct an 
activity, the entity needs to obtain its own tax-exempt statuS. 314 Due to 
the entity's relationship to the church, the Code typically classifies it as 
an "integrated auxiliary.,,315 The IRS regulations define an "integrated 
305. Id. at 8. 
306. I.R.C. § 508(b), (c)(l)(A) (2006). An organization that meets the 
requirements of section 501(c)(3) is classified as either a "public charity" or a "private 
foundation." See id. § 509(a). A "public charity" typically receives its income from a 
broader segment of the general public in the form of gifts, contril?utions, or receipts 
from the performance of services, whereas a "private foundation" typically receives 
contributions from only a few individuals or entities. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 
289, at 75l. Furthermore, private foundations are subject to additional excise taxes. See 
id. §§ 4941-45. 
307. See id. § 508(c)(l). 
308. See id. § 508(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § l.508-1(a)(3)(i)(a) (as amended in 
1995). 
309. See id § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i). 
310. See id. § 761l. 
31l. NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING 
NONPROFIT AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 8.03[Cl, at 112 (2006) (citing I.R.C. 
§§ 41O(c)(l)(B), 411(e)(l)(B), 412(h)(4), 414(e), 1402(e), 3121(b)(8), 3401(a)(9». 
312. Id § 8.06, at 114. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. 
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auxiliary" as a separate entity that is (1) a charitable organization (for 
example, a school, mission society, or youth group); (2) a public 
charity (as opposed to a private foundation);316 (3) internally 
supported; 317 and (4) affiliated with a church, convention, or association 
of churches. 318 An organization meets the "affiliated" requirement if (1) 
it is covered by a group exemption letter issued to a church;319 (2) it is 
operated, supervised, or controlled by that church; or (3) pertinent facts 
and circumstances establish such an affiliation. 320 
Under prior regulatory law, an organization had to engage in an 
activity that was "exclusively religious" to qualify as an integrated 
auxiliary. 321 An organization did not meet that standard if its activity 
"was of a nature other than religious that would serve as a basis for tax 
exemption"322-for example, educational or scientific activity. The 
Eighth Circuit, however, has held that this requirement was not 
consistent with congressional intent, thereby concluding that a social-
service agency could constitute an integrated auxiliary of a church. 323 
316. See supra note 306. 
317. An organization is "internally supported" unless it both 
(1) offers admissions, goods, services, or facilities for sale, other than on 
an incidental basis, to the general public (except goods, services, or 
facilities sold at a nominal charge or for an insubstantial portion of the 
cost); and (2) normally receives more than 50 percent of its support from a 
combination of governmental sources, public solicitation of contributions, 
and receipts from the sale of admissions, goods, performance of services, 
or furnishing of facilities in activities that are not unrelated trades or 
businesses. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(4) (as amended in 1995». 
318. See id. § 1.6033-2(h)(1). 
319. A group-exemption letter-or "group ruling" -requires the church's 
central organization to report the entities and affiliates covered by its exemption 
annually to the IRS and to certify that each meets the requirements for exemption under 
section 501(c)(3). See CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 311, § 8.05, at 113. 
320. HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 8.5, at 243 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-
2(h)(2». The regulations provide a nonexclusive list of factors used to determine 
whether an organization is affiliated: (1) the organization's charter or bylaws reveal that 
it shares common religious doctrines or practices with a church; (2) such church has the 
power to appoint, control, or remove at least one of the organization's officers or 
directors; (3) its name indicates an institutional relationship; and (4) upon dissolution, 
its assets are to be distributed to such church. [d. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(3». 
321. [d. § 8.5, at 244. 
322. [d. 
323. See id § 8.5, at 244-45 (citing Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Minn. v. United 
States, 758 F.2d 1283, 1291 (8th Cir. 1985». 
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b. Exception for a "Church" 
There should be an exception for churches from the proposed 
nondiscrimination requirement, because the proposal's application 
would likely violate the Free Exercise Clause through the regulation of 
religious belief. 324 Furthermore, the proposal does not intend to control 
what members of churches believe or with whom they share these 
beliefs. Consequently, an express section 501(c)(3) exception to the 
nondiscrimination requirement for churches is necessary. 325 Because the 
Code's definition of a church also encompasses integrated auxiliaries, it 
must be tailored to exclude such separate, affiliated entities for 
purposes of the notice and annual-reporting provisions. Furthermore, to 
address situations in which a congregational church conducts a school 
or social-service agency within the same legal entity, Congress should 
amend the statutory definition of the term "church" in sections 508 and 
6033. This amendment should reflect the fifteen-point test, with specific 
emphasis on the criterion of an established and dynamic 
congregation.326 
Such a restricted definition would likely gamer criticism from 
those who believe that there are already too many limitations on 
churches in the Code.327 A more narrow definition of "church"-for 
purposes of sections 508 and 6033-however, does not preclude a 
324. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
325. For example, Congress could further amend the nondiscrimination 
requirement in section 50I(c)(3) to include the following subparagraph: 
In the case of a church, as defined in section 508(c)(I)(A), this shall not 
apply to the extent that the application would not be consistent with the 
church's established tenets or creed. 
In addition, Congress should also extend the exception to religious orders and similar 
exclusively religious organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3). Neither the Code 
nor applicable regulations defme "religious orders." HOPKINS, supra note 55, § 8.6, at 
245. The IRS, however, has issued guidelines for determining whether an organization 
'qualifies. See Rev. Proc. 91-20,1991-1 C.B. 524. 
326. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. 
327. See, e.g., Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: 
Have American Churches Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax 
Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 74 (2004); Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the 
Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35 (2004). Some 
scholars believe that there are already too many limitations on churches. See, e.g., 
Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors-Campaigning from the Pulpit is Okay: Thinking 
Past the Symbolism of Section 501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 
125 (2006); Christine R. Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and the "Charitable 
Scrutiny" Test, 15 REGENTU. L. REv. 295 (2003). 
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broader definition for other purposes (for instance, the FICA tax 
provisions).328 
The Bob Jones University Court, in upholding the imposition of a 
racial-nondiscrimination policy, appeared to similarly appreciate the 
difference between a church and a "religious" school by stating that 
"[w]e deal here only with religious schools-not with churches or other 
purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest is in 
denying public support to racial discrimination in education ... 329 In 
addition, the Court rejected the university's claim that the denial of its 
tax exemption violated the Establishment Clause330: 
[A] regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause 
merely because it "happens to coincide or harmonize with the 
tenets of some or all religions." The IRS policy at issue here 
is founded on a "neutral, secular basis," and does not violate 
the Establishment Clause. In addition, as the Court of Appeals 
noted, "the uniform application of the rule to all religiously 
operated schools avoids the necessity for a potentially 
entangling inquiry into whether a racially restrictive practice 
is the result of sincere religious belief. .. 331 
Based on this reasoning, if a section 501(c)(3) nondiscrimination 
requirement applied to all charitable organizations, other than churches 
or "other purely religious institutions, .. 332 it would not violate the 
Establishment Clause. Rather, the provision would be based on a 
governmental interest to deny public support to charitable organizations 
that discriminate. By limiting the scope of the term "church," the 
requirement could ensure that charitable organizations do not use tax-
deductible dollars they receive to discriminate against members of 
society. 
An alternative solution would not require any changes to the 
current definition and treatment of churches and church-affiliated 
328. See I.R.C. § 3121(w)(3) (2000). Any amendment to the language of 
sections 508 and 6033 should be reflected in other Code sections that adopt the 
"integrated auxiliaries" or "integrated auxiliary" language. See, e.g., id. 
§§ 501(h)(5)(B), 6043(b)(1); cf. Charles M. Whelan, "Church" in the Intemal Revenue 
Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 887 (1977) (contending 
that there are too many "church distinctions" in the Code, resulting in "considerable 
concern and confusion" among church leaders, legal advisors, and the Treasury 
Department). 
329. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983). 
330. See id. at 604 n.30. 
331. Id. 
332. See id. at 604 n.29. 
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entItles. According to a 1975 Revenue Ruling-issued after the IRS's 
announcement that schools with racially discriminatory policies would 
no longer receive tax exemptions333 -the IRS may use the public-policy 
doctrine to deny or revoke the exempt status of a church or a separate 
affiliated entity that operated and controlled a school with a racially 
discriminatory admissions policy.334 In the Ruling, the IRS presented 
several scenarios, involving (l) school X with a racially discriminatory 
admissions policy that was incorporated as a separate entity, but 
affiliated with and controlled by a church; and (2) a school, with the 
same policy as school X, operated directly within the church entity 
y' 335 
In the first scenario, the IRS held that X was not operated 
exclusively for charitable purposes (and therefore did not qualify for 
exempt status under section 501(c)(3», but this had no effect on the 
church's exemption. 336 In the second scenario, the IRS concluded that 
there should be no disparate result just because the school was operated 
within Y; accordingly, it found that Y was not exempt under section 
501 (c )(3).337 In a third scenario, the IRS similarly denied exempt status 
to a church that operated both X and Y schools and that used its 
religious tenets to justify a racially discriminatory policy. 338 The IRS 
relied on Reynolds339 and subsequent Supreme Court cases that 
concluded that, although the Free Exercise Clause bars government 
interference into religious beliefs and opinions, it does not necessarily 
"affect the legal consequences otherwise attending a given practice or 
action that is not inherently religious. ,,340 
333. 
334. 
C.B.230). 
335. 
336. 
See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
See Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158 (citing Rev. Rul. 71-447,1971-2 
See id at 158. 
See id at 159. 
337. See id The IRS based its conclusion on Norwood v. Harrison, in which 
the Supreme Court held that a state may not provide free textbooks to a private school 
if such provision would have a "significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support 
private discrimination." See id (citing 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973)). The Court did not 
make an exception "for the schools that were not separate legal organizations but were 
directly operated by churches receiving free textbooks." ld The IRS concluded that 
"the legal organization operating Y [in the second scenario was] frustrating Federal 
public policy by having a racially or ethnically discriminatory policy as to students." 
ld. 
338. Seeid. 
339. See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text. 
340. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F. 2d 879 
(7th Cir. 1954)). In the ruling, the IRS explained the following: 
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Based on this reasoning, the proposed nondiscrimination 
requirement could lead to similar conclusions with respect to tax-
exempt status. Specifically, the imposition of a nondiscrimination 
requirement on churches and their affiliates would not be 
unconstitutional, in that the requirement would only address churches' 
practices or actions, not their religious beliefs or opinions. 341 To date, 
however, no federal court has validated the conclusions set forth in the 
Revenue Ruling. 
4. OTHER POTENTIAL ISSUES 
Another potential difficulty with the nondiscrimination-requirement 
proposal is how it would apply to same-gender or same-religion 
organizations, such as an all-girls Catholic high school or an entity 
directing its relief and educational programs at poverty-stricken Kenyan 
immigrants. The dilemma of whether the amended section 501(c)(3) 
would deny tax-exempt status because of this type of discrimination 
immediately surfaced in the years after Bob Jones University.342 The 
IRS was reluctant to extend the public-policy doctrine to such 
situations ,343 in part because the doctrine fails to designate a clear 
source of public policy. 344 Perhaps the IRS did not view such instances 
of discrimination as invidious or harmful, and thus believed they fell 
outside of the doctrine's intended purposes and goals. 
The important distinction between religious belief, on the one hand, and the 
legal consequences that may validly be attached to action induced by 
religious belief, on the other, is well illustrated by one recent line of cases 
interpreting the Federal drug laws. The courts have repeatedly refused to 
engraft a religious exception on any criminal statute outlawing the 
transportation of heroin, marijuana, and peyote into the United States, 
notwithstanding an apparent judicial recognition that a given accused might 
sincerely believe the use of such drugs has a proper place in certain 
religious ceremonies which are prescribed in both the Koran and the Bible. 
Id. (citing United States v. Spears, 443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
341. See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction 
between religious beliefs and religious practices). 
342. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 289, at 424. 
343. See Rev. Rul. 77-272, 1972-2 C.B. 191 (holding that an organization 
providing job training exclusively for Native Americans did not violate the public-
policy doctrine because it was formed at the request of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
accomplished goals set forth in the Adult Vocational Training Act); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 77-44-007 (July 28, 1977) (ruling that a SCholarship fund limiting grants to male 
graduates at a co-ed high school did not violate the public-policy doctrine because the 
doctrine did not extent to gender-based discrimination). 
344. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
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Accordingly, the best solution may lie with the statutory definition 
of "discrimination" -specifically, whether it targets policies or 
practices that are wrongful, harmful, or invidious. An amendment to 
section 501(c)(3) should contain a legislative grant to the IRS, along 
with some clearly defmed parameters, which would allow the agency to 
promulgate regulations that set forth examples of what constitutes 
discrimination. For instance, gender-based discrimination might not be 
deemed to exist in same-sex schools based on other factors such as 
possible pedagogical benefits and a lack of a concerted effort to 
specifically exclude the other gender. In addition, national-origin 
discrimination may be deemed not to exist with respect to an 
organization whose mission has an established record of combating 
poverty in an area of a city that happens to be largely comprised of a 
particular immigrant population. Ultimately, whether or not a particular 
policy or action constitutes discrimination would depend on a facts-and-
circumstances determination, with standards and burdens of proof 
borrowed from established federal civil-rights laws and other 
nondiscrimination statutes. 345 
Two General Counsel Memoranda illustrate this point. In the first 
memorandum, issued before Bob Jones University, the IRS concluded 
that a scholarship trust that restricted eligible beneficiaries to Caucasian 
students furthered racial discrimination in education, contrary to 
established federal public policy. 346 Notwithstanding this conclusion, the 
IRS doubted that administering such a trust would adversely impact the 
school's exemption because it was de minimis in relation to the school's 
aggregate scholarship program. 347 In the second memorandum, issued 
immediately after Bob Jones University, however, the IRS revoked this 
"per se rule," favoring instead the case-by-case examination of 
scholarship trusts that restrict eligibility to Caucasian students. 348 The 
IRS explained that, for instance, a private trust that grants scholarships 
only to Caucasian students to enroll at a "predominantly minority 
school could be said actually to discourage racial discrimination in 
345. For example, in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Court stated that "[t]he 
complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of 
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination." 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To 
overcome it, the complainant must prove certain facts in order to shift the burden to the 
prospective employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee's rejection." Jd.; see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-10 
(1993) (discussing the difference between the "disparate treatment" and "disparate 
impact" theories of employment discrimination in the context of potential employer 
liability for age discrimination). 
346. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,462 (Mar. 17, 1978). 
347. See id 
348. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,082 (Dec. 1, 1983). 
2007:45 Is It "Charitable" to Discriminate? 105 
education. "349 The IRS further concluded that the "well-established 
policy of promoting private educational trusts should, on balance, 
prevail even where the benefits of the trust are limited to members of a 
particular race. ,,350 The IRS ultimately found that the school charged 
with administering the trust adopted and maintained a racial-
nondiscrimination policy and the trust accounted for a small share of 
the total fmancial assistance available to students. 351 
While critics may claim that the nondiscrimination-requirement 
proposal is unnecessary in light of the numerous state and local 
nondiscrimination laws,352 such laws apply in varying degrees and in 
limited situations, and may not apply directly to charitable 
organizations. In addition, such laws are constantly challenged and, 
therefore, cannot ensure the same comprehensive application to 
charitable organizations that could be achieved through a section 
501(c)(3) amendment. 353 Although state and local nondiscrimination 
laws are important and effective in curbing discrimination, they do not 
prohibit charitable organizations from using the tax-deductible dollars 
they receive to discriminate against members of society . 
V. CONCLUSION 
A charitable organization should not continue to enjoy the benefits 
of tax-exempt status if it engages in discrimination, because it is 
intrinsically incompatible with a charitable purpose and mission. In 
filling the current void in federal income-tax law with respect to such 
discrimination, the nondiscrimination-requirement proposal seeks to 
transform section 501(c)(3) into the "gold standard" for all tax-exempt 
organizations, by ensuring that their beneficiaries are as diverse as the 
taxpaying public from which they draw their support. 
By avoiding reliance on the ill-defmed public-policy doctrine or on 
questionably applicable federal civil-rights laws, a nondiscrimination 
requirement in section 501(c)(3) offers a more comprehensive solution 
to the problem of discriminatory policies and practices in charitable 
organizations. It would send a strong message that discrimination is 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. See Lambda Legal, Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which 
Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-
work/states/ (last visited June 17, 2007). 
353. See, e.g., Jonathan Saltzman, Romney Eyes Bill Exempting Religious 
Groups on Bias Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, at A4; Christopher Heredia, 
Salvation AI711Y Says No Benefits for Partners, S.P. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2001, at A22; 
Milbank, supra note 167. 
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fundamentally inconsistent with tax-exempt status and conflicts with 
society's notion of what constitutes a charity. As the Bob Jones 
University Court stated, a charitable organization must "be in harmony 
with the public interest" and its purpose "must not be so at odds with 
the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit 
that might otherwise be conferred. ,,354 
This proposal, however, is not completely free from difficulties 
and challenges. Nevertheless, by permitting discriminatory 
organizations to qualify as tax-exempt social-welfare organizations 
under section 501(c)(4), a section 501(c)(3) nondiscrimination 
requirement should withstand any constitutional challenges and pluralist 
criticisms. To ensure comprehensive nondiscrimination in light of First 
Amendment concerns, Congress should consider redefining the term 
"church" for purposes of the notice and annual-reporting provisions 
under sections 508 and 6033 of the Code. Tailoring the definition to the 
fifteen-point test and providing a specific emphasis on the criterion of 
an established and dynamic congregation would expose the "integrated 
auxiliaries" of churches to the proposed nondiscrimination requirement. 
Revisions of section 501(c)(3) should also address the intended meaning 
of "discrimination" with respect to discriminatory organizations that 
otherwise operate exclusively for exempt purposes under section 
501(c)(3). 
In a message to Congress calling for the enactment of Title VI, 
President John F. Kennedy stated that "[s]imple justice requires that 
public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent 
in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in 
racial discrimination. ,,355 The inclusion of an expansive 
nondiscrimination requirement in section 501(c)(3) is a necessary step 
in effectuating this vision. 
354. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,592 (1983). 
355. 109 CONGo REC. 11,161 (1963). 
